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In 1969, President Richard Nixon ended the U.S. biological weapons program 
proclaiming, “massive, unpredictable, and potentially uncontrollable consequences.” 
Additionally, he added, “our [the United States government] bacteriological programs in 
the future will be confined to research in biological defense, on techniques of 
immunization, and on measures on controlling and preventing the spread of disease.”1 
President Nixon understood the dangerous potential weaponizing living organism could 
have on society and the dilemma in controlling their development. In the subsequent 
pages, I explore the complex relationship between disease, public health, warfare, 
bioterrorism and national security. By examining the system of biodefense strategies, the 
study will highlight the effectiveness of biodefense policies on countering bioterrorism, 
securing immunity and promoting greater security. The arguments in the research 
contribute to the greater debate about the designation of bioweapons and their potential 
threat. The weapons of mass destruction categories include chemical, biological, 
radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats. However, many agree that while these threats 
can cause widespread panic and harm to the public, only nuclear weapons can be 
classified with causing mass destruction. For that reason, the examination will focus on 
the apparent threat caused by biological weapons and the issues that complicate their 
designation as a weapon of mass destruction.  
More specifically the examination will progress over several research topics that 
challenge the effectiveness of current biodefense strategies; explores the potential threat 
1  Nixon, Richard. "Remarks Announcing Decisions on Chemical and Biological Defense Policies and 




                                                          
of bioterrorism; and examines the dangers of defensive medical countermeasures and 
immunity on vulnerable populations. These topics will assist in providing a clear 
understanding of the threat biological weapons pose and contribute to the effort for 
developing strategies to counter their proliferation. 
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Today, world health organizations and national health departments are being 
tested on how well they prepare for, respond to, and recover from natural and man-made 
public health emergencies. We live in the most technically advanced time and we have 
never had more understanding of medicine, microbiology, molecular chemistry and 
advanced research methods.  More lifesaving treatments exist today for diseases that used 
to be death sentences not too long ago.  However, with this increase in knowledge a 
larger threat to public health and national security has emerged.  Observing how diseases 
have impacted human welfare, economic growth and overall national security, it is 
appropriate that intersections between security and public health are recognized and 
controlled.  Up until 2001 health related issues were not tied to national security 
strategies.  Yet, the threat risk terrorists and rogue states pose in creating wide spread 
epidemics and pressure on public health systems that could cripple national readiness and 
overwhelm medical infrastructure, continue to gain greater attention and legitimacy.  
Budgets and new programs have directly reflected the priorities and strategies to prepare 
for biological events and it is apparent that from historic pandemics to biological 
weapons testing the health of a nation is a national security issue.   
In the subsequent pages this research progresses over several questions that deal 
with public health as a national security concern.  Chapter One explores biological 
weapons’ unique characteristics that create ambiguity domestically and contradictions 
internationally. It examines the proliferation of biological agents under the guise of 
biodefense that can be peaceful and beneficial to society, but have the potential to cause a 
massive pandemic if mismanaged or acquired by the wrong group or government.  
Overall the chapter will focus on the relationship between biodefense and its 
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effectiveness in keeping the nation safe from widespread manmade and natural public 
health emergencies caused by biological events, such as bioagents used to infect the 
population or the intentional spread of infectious diseases.  It will examine whether or not 
biodefense strategies are effective in maintaining national security objectives to reduce 
the risk of biological weapons use?  In order to do this, the chapter, defines biodefense 
and what elements make up a biodefense strategy.  Additionally, the analysis will address 
what constitutes an effective biodefense program and the various measures for 
determining its efficacy.  The chapter includes an examination of the 2001 Anthrax Letter 
attacks and compares the effectiveness of U.S. biodefense strategies during that time by 
looking at policy changes in response to potential future biological weapons threats. 
Chapter Two will investigate the genesis of how people learned to use illnesses as 
a tool against enemies and the impact they’ve had in progressing ideology and 
organizational strategy.  It will address the time we live in where biological weapons are 
considered a ‘weapon of mass destruction’ (WMD), where this designation would be 
better categorized as a ‘weapon of mass disruption.’  For example, modern medicine has 
brought about the possibilities to mitigate the impact of a variety of biological agents, and 
modern-day society has not experienced the impact of a biological weapon with mass 
destructive possibilities, yet, the WMD designation still holds up.  However, the aim of 
Chapter Two is not to question the designation, but to add specific analysis for explaining 
why, in some sense, biological weapons are a threat.  
The chapter examines whether experts in the field of bioterrorism have convinced 
the world that the threats from biological weapons pose greater dangers to society than 
they actually do?  Or have governments implemented the correct strategies to monitor, 
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prevent and deter rogue states and violent non-state actors (VNSA) from pursuing large-
scale biological weapons attacks?  In an effort to understand these questions, the analysis 
in Chapter Two seeks to understand the relationship between deadly biological agents 
and violent terrorist organizations and how this dangerous couple became one of the most 
leading national security threats post-WWII according to intelligence officers, high-
ranking officials, and experts.  Therefore, the question to why the United States has not 
experienced a large scale, biological weapons attack by a non-state actor in the post 
WWII era will be answered? 
In order to address this question, the chapter will examine various themes on 
technological advancements in biotechnology and the methods of operation and 
organizational structure of terrorist groups.  More specifically, it will apply; revolutionary 
versus evolutionary based narratives on the threats posed by biological agents; second, it 
uses this information to examine technology’s influence on terrorist organizations’ 
weapons choice; lastly, the chapter compares terrorist organization structure and 
terrorists’ method of operation to create a concise profile of the most likely bioterrorist.  
By synthesizing this information, a concise model for explaining why non-state actors 
have not used biological weapons in a large-scale attack can be determined. 
Chapter Three, will explore the intersections of biological warfare and immunity 
by looking at the historic introduction of disease and how the lack of immunity has 
shaped the geopolitical world and determined the strength of nations. It will focus on how 
immunity has changed societies and sometimes provided unintentional strategic 
positioning. For many societies building immunity and fighting infectious diseases was as 
valuable as gaining territory or advancing technologically in defense strategies and 
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weaponry. For example, the Spanish successful conquest over the Aztecs and Incas can 
be attributed to the Spanish conquistador’s immunity to smallpox and measles. These 
illnesses had a major physical and psychological effect on the indigenous populations in 
the Americas.  This event led to the eventual Spanish dominance on the continent.  The 
unintentional consequence of the Spanish conquistadors’ immunity led to the subjugation 
and downfall of the ancient Inca and Aztec civilizations in less than three years.  
However, had the Spanish not dealt with these diseases previously in Spain then history 
would have told a different story. 
Chapter three draws on the experiences of historical pandemics and colonial 
epidemics and noting the role disease and immunity has played in the intentional or 
unintentional strategic advantage of one society over another, the study will examine how 
efforts to develop immunity to diseases advances national or international security or 
insecurity and to what degree. It will also examine whether or not immunity to virulent, 
communicable diseases can be used as a passive weapon of mass casualty and disruption 
to further power and influence.  
In order to properly examine the question as to whether or not efforts to develop 
immunity to diseases advances national or international security and to what degree can 
immunity become a weapon of mass casualty and destruction? The implications of a 
healthy population have to be linked to the security of a nation. Such as, public health 
needs to be recognized as an implicit component of national security or otherwise there is 
no reason to discuss public safety, disease surveillance, and any national system geared 
toward contributing to the well-being of the populace.  
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The final section of this examination will recap the analysis across the chapters. It 
will draw on the findings and conclusions of each case study to facilitate a grand 
understanding of biosecurity and biosafety in the United States and in the international 
community. Additionally, the final section will reiterate the key recommendations 
concluded in each chapter. These recommendations are based on the various case studies 
highlighted in each chapter to support the overarching hypothesis.  
The subsequent pages will frame and organize thoughts and literature surrounding 
the efficacy of biodefense policies and practices. They will provide historical context as 
well as provide an understanding of the various arguments in the field of biodefense, 
biosurveillance and biosecurity. Their ultimate goal is to assist in unravelling the 
complex issues dealing with the convergence of technology, public health and national 






Examining the Effectiveness of Biodefense Strategies Post 9/11 
 
Introduction 
Biological weapons possess unique characteristics that create ambiguity 
domestically and contradictions internationally.  Unlike any weapon known to conflict or 
diplomacy, biological weapons can be masked by altruistic intentions and dual-use 
justification.   Their proliferation under the guise of biodefense can be deemed peaceful 
and beneficial to society, but have the potential to cause a massive pandemic if 
mismanaged or acquired by the wrong group or government.  They can be produced 
secretly and used without discernible or traceable origins mitigating political blowback 
and accountability.  Biological weapons can be disguised as a bottle of perfume in carry-
on luggage or disseminated by a cough or sneeze among world leaders at a G8 meeting.  
Additionally, terrorist organizations can acquire the basic tool and understanding to 
produce them with no more than an EBay account, google and limited financial 
resources.  The threats these weapons produce are endless, non-discriminating and 
evolving.  Former U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton at the Seventh Biological and 
Toxin Weapons Convention Review Conference noted, “we [the United States] view the 
risk of a bioweapons attack as both a serious national security challenge and a foreign 
policy priority… bioweapons are a transnational threat, and therefore we must protect 
against them with transnational action.” This statement by Clinton acknowledges the 
dangers that biological weapons pose on the public throughout the world and the need for 
states to protect against their use.  However, she also acknowledges the unique security 
challenges bioweapons pose. 
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 This paper will focus on the relationship between biodefense policy and 
strategies and their effectiveness on national security and international non-proliferation 
efforts.  Specifically, it will answer whether or not biodefense strategies are effective in 
maintaining national security objectives and reducing the risk of biological weapons use 
and proliferation?  In order to do this, however, it is important to first define biodefense 
and what elements make up a biodefense strategy.  Additionally, the analysis will address 
what constitutes an effective biodefense program and the various measures for 
determining its efficacy.  It will also include an examination of the 2001 Anthrax Letter 
attacks and examine the effectiveness of U.S. biodefense strategies during that time and 
look at policy changes in response to potential future biological weapons threats.  
Literature Review 
Monitoring and Detection  
 In his book American Biodefense: How Dangerous Ideas about Biological 
Weapons Shape National Security, Frank L. Smith III, argues that the lack of military 
support and the increase in civilian sponsorship of biodefense is consequential and 
counterintuitive. Smith bases his argument on the idea that civilian sponsorship of 
biodefense perpetuates biological weapon stereotypes that are counter the role biodefense 
plays in national security. He is a strong advocate for the militarization of medical 
countermeasures over the socially constructed relationship between public health and 
civilian biodefense.   
A large part of biodefense is being ready for a biological incident or emergency.  
Monitoring people and events and detecting bio-agents early can take place in several 
areas of biodefense from monitoring scientists in a lab to early outbreak identification.  
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Many scholars advocate for more intelligence collection by increasing clandestine 
activities in order to identify violations of biological weapons agreements.2  Other 
experts suggest developing robust biosurveillance systems and databases to track 
pathogens.  The expansion of monitoring and detection is where the challenges of 
biodefense meet the challenges of public health.3  This section will focus on several of 
these challenges including, situational awareness, biosurveillance, and private and public 
coordination efforts. 
 In 1984, a small religious group in Oregon poisoned 751 people in a small town 
by infecting salad bars with Salmonella typhimurium to sway local election results.  The 
common occurrence of salmonella poisoning from contaminated foods allowed the 
religious group to get away with their bio-attack for two years, until a former member 
confessed to authorities what the group had done.4  This case is a prime example of the 
insecurity caused by not having adequate monitoring and detection strategies within 
biodefense.  The religious group was able to buy dangerous pathogens, including the 
Salmonella typhimurium bacteria that had poisoned 751 people because they registered 
as a medical corporation.  This scenario could possibly be repeated due to the lack of 
monitoring mechanisms specifically, the sale of deadly pathogens and the lack of bio-
surveillance.  In 2007, the U.S. government through the Department of Homeland 
Security created the National Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC). The mission of 
NBIC is to rapidly identify, characterize, and track any biological event of national 
concern that may impact human, animal, plant, or water health.  The NBIC works to 
consolidate information from federal, state, local and commercial sources to better 
2 Guillemin 2005 
3 Schneider 2004 
4 Miller, Engelberg & Broad 2001, 30-32 
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monitor activities and make informed decisions on potential bio threats.5  For example, 
according to the Center for Disease Control (CDC), there were eight different events in 
the U.S. involving different strands of salmonella bacteria. However, it provides a great 
case for developing more efficient monitoring and detection. 
Awareness  
Many field experts recommend improving syndrome and public health 
surveillance.6  They also suggest starting bio-threat awareness with our hospitals and 
doctors through workforce training and disease identification.7  During a random test 
administered to 17 of Pennsylvania’s Allegheny County’s doctors only two were able to 
match the correct symptoms to smallpox.  Additionally, an emergency physician in the 
state of Maryland said that patients would need to be displaying the most severe 
symptoms of anthrax before he or his staff could diagnose them.8  Our current system 
relies heavily on first responders to identify a biological attack by recognizing symptoms 
and reporting their findings.  However, the problems with this type of passive 
surveillance are they become inaccurate, timely, and limited in coverage.  It requires 
constant training and still there are no guarantees against human error.9  During times of 
disaster and public health emergencies the nation relies on more than 200,000 Medical 
Reserve Corps (MRC) volunteers to support local, state and territorial jurisdictions.10 
However, a survey of 837 MRC volunteers on optional and mandatory training showed 
5 National Biosurveillance Integration Center, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 
http://www.dhs.gov/national-biosurveillance-integration-center   
6Koblentz 2009, 232 
7 Schneider 2004, 37 
8 Bartlett 1999, 563 
9 Schneider 2004, 37 




                                                          
that less than 50 percent of volunteers participated in training for pandemic planning.  
Additionally, less than 30 percent have participated in disease detection and screening.11  
In Dallas, Texas on September 24th 2014, an individual that just arrived from Ebola 
ridden Liberia reported to a hospital with common symptoms of the Ebola virus and was 
sent home after seeing a doctor.  The same individual returned to the hospital after his 
symptoms had worsened and was put into an isolation unit because he tested positive for 
with the Ebola virus.  Because the doctor was not trained on the symptoms and 
epidemiological procedures, he risked putting others in harm’s way and potentially 
creating a larger outbreak of Ebola in the area.12  Public health workers have to be aware 
of potential threats as well as foreign possibilities.  Much like in the Oregon case where 
the genesis of the problem was masked by an unsanitary restaurant, a highly contagious 
disease like smallpox could infect a huge population before public health officials are 
even aware of a problem if they are not trained properly.  Additionally, any biological 
weapons attack is most likely to target the civilian population.13  Therefore, the public 
must be aware of symptoms caused by the most deadly bio-agents through public service 
announcements from radio and television nationally and not limited to areas where we 




11 Ibid. p.22 
12 Khazan, Olga, The Texas Ebola Patient Has Died. 
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/10/the-texas-ebola-patient-has-died/381236/  
13 According to the information found in Figure.2, known uses of biological weapons have been used on 
civilian populations. With the exception of the Sverdlovsk anthrax case that was accidental. From these 
historical cases the assumption is made that the most likely target for any effective and mass casualty 
attack with biological weapons is a large civilian population.  
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Figure 2. Known Biological Weapons Incidents  
DATE LOCATION ATTACKER AGENT AFFECTED POP CASUALTIES 
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1940 – 
















prisoners 1,000 killed, 2,000 injured 
Source: modified by author from Robert Johnston’s Summary of Historical Attacks using Chemical or 
Biological Weapons, Oct.2014 
 
Surveillance 
 There are various opportunities for surveillance.  Laboratory surveillance is one 
obvious location to implement surveillance strategies.  As the biodefense industry grows 
and more private labs fight for government contracts and grants to research and develop 
medical countermeasures, more monitoring will be required.  In 2002, in response to a 
heightened awareness to biological threats after the 2001 Anthrax Letter attacks, the CDC 
was given $9 billion to fund Public Health Emergency Preparedness.  As part of this 
preparedness funding, eight performance measures associated with laboratory safety were 
instituted as major indicators of lab safety and security.  These indicators dealt mainly 
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with reporting, communications, samples management, testing, surge capacity, and 
response.  However, many private labs are out to make money and many scientists just 
want to practice science.  Furthermore, many grant programs rely on self-reporting data, 
meaning the lab and lab’s administrators may report in the affirmative on procedures that 
they are not compliant with in hopes to win contracts or retain grant funding. Yet, 
governments prefer labs maintain high levels of employment for laboratory scientists due 
to their potential contributions to explicit activities.  Therefore, there is an emphasis on 
keeping bioresearch scientists employed so they’re not offered opportunities to develop 
biological weapons for rogue states, terror organizations, or contribute to the illicit drug 
trade.  Much like in 1997, South Africa uncovered an illicit drug trafficking cartel, 
operated by the former head of South Africa’s apartheid-era biological weapons 
program.14  This is in no way the norm, however, this particular scenario illustrates a 
need for strict monitoring and surveillance of scientists trusted with national security.  
Currently, the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and 
Response Act of 2002 requires that the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
and Department of Agriculture to, regulate safety training and security of laboratories 
handling bio-agents; register labs and individuals with access; develop a “fingerprinting” 
catalog of all bio-agents in the lab; create a restricted persons list; conduct periodic 
inspections of inventory.15  Yet, these requirements refer to labs that are not active in 
secret biodefense research, which should also be subject to these types of surveillance 
requirements.  However, many suggest that these requirements are expensive and 
difficult to institute at smaller laboratories.  For example, public universities using 
14 Koblentz 2009, 106 
15 Klotz,Sylvester 1999,1647 
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volunteer graduate students to assist in research can’t afford to sponsor clearances, nor do 
they have the time to wait for graduate students to clear a thorough background check.  
Other barriers to surveillance strategies are the inability of local, state and federal 
governments to streamline the process of biosurveillance.  Cuts in budgets have halted a 
lot of progress made in health information systems that have been used to streamline a 
more efficient disease monitoring system, increasing the effectiveness of rapid response.  
These types of systems proved their worth during the 2009 H1N1 influenza epidemic, 
where these systems assisted in explaining how the disease was spreading, but more 
importantly, how to stop the spread of the disease.  Specifically, the Real Time 
Immunization Monitoring System (RTIMS) monitored school children (K-12) and 
healthcare workers and reported adverse events and provided rapid response to 
individuals reporting serious symptoms.16  Additionally, integration and international 
collaboration on disease and outbreak surveillance is crucial in today’s global society.  
Yet, communication, data sharing, and epidemic intelligence is still far from being a 
beneficial system to securing public health from emergencies.  Whether naturally 
occurring or intentionally inflicted, these systems are necessary for meeting national 
security objectives.  
Coordination 
 As mentioned previously, there is general consensus on surveillance as the 
primary method for effective detection.  Additionally, effective surveillance of known 
and dangerous bio-agents is necessary in order to be categorized and shared nationally 
with local, state and federal public health officials.  In 1998, a bio-fingerprinting system 




                                                          
called PulseNet was created to assist in detecting a bioterrorism attack by allowing public 
health officials to share information nationally.  Schneider suggests that if the United 
States is going to have a sustainable biodefense program that emphasizes preparedness 
then the training needs to be coordinated at local and state level institutions, nursing 
programs, and medical schools-- with the federal government writing the rules and 
regulations.  He also recommends that first responders get certified and recertified 
annually and that the federal government standardizes any surveillance and detection 
criteria.17  In addition to national coordination, international coordination should also be 
considered as an important way to effectively utilize biodefense strategies.  Koblentz and 
Preston call for greater coordination internationally and calls on the United States to work 
with allies to secure transparency and biodefense efforts to respond to epidemics.18  
Since, a highly contagious epidemic knows no boarders, it is important to have 
international cooperation and information sharing to mitigate the impact of diseases.  For 
example, avian flu (H5N1) created a threat for eight years from 1997 to 2005 with 16 
outbreaks in the United States with cases stemming from Asia, Africa, Europe and the 
Near East.  It took the coordination of the World Health Organization and local health 
departments to monitor and eventually contain the virus.  According to the CDC, H5N1 is 
known to have been a low pathogenic outbreak and yet it took public health officials a 
large effort to contain it.  It is more difficult to think of this threat in terms of a high 
pathogenic outbreak that infects people quickly with a high mortality rate, the resulting 
damage would be catastrophic. 
17 Schneider, 2004, 43-44 
18 Koblentz, P2reston 2009, 234; 2007, 258 
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 Expanding biodefense through monitoring and detection efforts is backed by a lot 
of general consensus and common recommendations to increase public awareness, 
develop greater surveillance mechanisms, and promote greater national and international 
coordination.  Monitoring and detection strategies are the most effective in keeping us 
safe.  Being one step ahead of an outbreak by knowing its treatment and its contagion 
pattern is a purely defensive mechanism.  In addition, monitoring research and 
development creates the necessary checks and balances that allow officials to prevent or 
mitigate any attempts by rogue scientists to use deadly pathogens from sponsored labs.  
Physical Protection 
 The physical protection strategies of biodefense expansion are preventative in 
theory, but are more applicable to safeguarding against an attack that is or will take place 
and epitomizes defensive strategy.  They are not truly preventative because they do not 
stop an attack before it takes place.  The Aum Shinrikyo attacks on Tokyo’s subway 
illustrated the impact biological weapons can have in a crowded and confined space.  
There is not a lot of literature dealing with the necessary physical infrastructure needed to 
completely protect against a bioweapons attack.  However, Koblentz suggests the best 
physical protections are filtration systems in buildings and vehicles.19  In this section, I 
will discuss the various forms of physical protection, specifically, private infrastructure, 
public infrastructure, and emergency medical equipment.  Private infrastructure refers to 
mainly private investment in creating new building standards that would take into an 
account bioterror events or safeguarding against wide spread epidemics.  More 
specifically, various trade groups can encourage members to set standards to retrofit large 
office or residential buildings with High Efficiency Particulate Air filters and positive 
19 Koblentz, (2009, 30) 
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pressure systems.  Public infrastructure on the other hand, will focus on government 
actions to protect critical infrastructure and utilities.  Finally, equipment refers to various 
articles the public can utilize to protect themselves from bio-agents contamination, much 
like the Community Fallout Program of the 1960s, during the Cold War.  
Private Infrastructure 
 Imagine for a moment a terrorist organization puts weapons grade anthrax powder 
in several air supply systems in various skyscrapers in New York, Chicago, and Los 
Angeles the impact would be catastrophic not only in the targeted buildings , but 
psychologically the country would come to a standstill.  For example, after the planes 
flew into the World Trade Center towers, planes were grounded for two days throughout 
the country and the world, which triggered various economic impacts to small businesses, 
employment, and overall national productivity.20  Today, buildings must meet a certain 
level of safety; including, fire protection, structural standards, earthquake, etc.  However, 
there is little concern or incentive for the private market to front the upfront cost to 
improve building air quality and protecting against possible airborne pathogens.  These 
types of improvements to building codes must happen at a policy level before private 
companies and trade associations endorse them.  One way the government can 
incentivize a program like this is by providing tax credits for companies that upgrade 
ventilation systems, much like energy standards and tax incentive programs work. 
In 2005, the Center for Biosecurity of the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center 
conducted a working group to address the issue of reducing the risk of biological 
weapons attacks on buildings through ventilation, filtration, and air conditioning systems.  
Their recommendations were low cost and effective.  They claim that most commercial 
20 Makinen, Gail. Economic Effects of 9/11: A Retrospective Assessment. 
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buildings use filters with a Minimum Efficiency Reporting Value (MERV) of 5 to 8. 
MERV values range from 1 to 20 with a higher value being a more efficient filter.  The 
working group’s main recommendation suggests commercial building replace their 
current filter with HEPA filters with a MERV from 17 to 20.21  This method could be 
used in every building as well as private homes to protect against a potential, massive 
attack where a warhead is used to spread airborne pathogens in a densely populated city 
or a lone wolf terrorist acting with a homemade aerosolized bio-agent.   
Retrofitting buildings and possibly vehicles with HEPA filters could potentially 
save many lives, but hesitation from industry leaders is also valid.  There are multiple 
ways a biological weapon could be disseminated and there are no guarantees that filters 
would mitigate that threat.  However, the price of inaction or not doing something may in 
the long run be the worst strategy and most costly.   
Public Infrastructure 
The Colorado River Aqueduct is one of the primary sources of drinking water for 
Southern California.  The opportunity for bioterrorists to contaminate and potentially 
wipe out 22 million people and economically cripple the seventh largest economy in the 
world is a possibility.  Developing a sensory system that can monitor various bio-agents 
in the water supply could protect millions.  In addition, after the 2001 anthrax letters, all 
mail sent to congressional offices is re-routed for processing at an off-site facility where 
mail is scanned with ultraviolet light and opened to protect against any copycat attempts 
to send dangerous bioagents through the postal service to lawmakers.  2004’s budget 
allocated $40 million for biosensors in densely populated cities.  Investments to public 
health facilities and reporting systems also received $50 million to combat bioterrorism. 
21 Hitchcock et al. 2006 
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Equipment 
 During the Cold War large public ad campaigns educated the public on what they 
would need to be prepared for a nuclear war.  The National Fallout Shelter Program was 
promoted in 1960 to help people get the necessary supplies.22  Today many states 
encourage individuals, families and communities to have emergency plans, which include 
various items that are necessary in cases of a national emergency.  Organized by the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Office of the Assistant 
Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) these programs focus on 
communication and in times of extreme emergency public coordination of emergency 
medical equipment (EME) or personal protection equipment (PPE).  Many programs rely 
on the public to stock and utilize private companies to acquire non-pharmaceutical 
medical equipment PPEs such as, medical facemasks, rubber gloves, sanitizers, etc.  
Other PPE might be as simple as plastic sheeting and duct tape to seal windows and 
doors. In addition to facemasks and a contaminate jumpsuit to mitigate exposure to any 
viruses buying HEPA filters can minimize exposure to airborne pathogens.  Any 
equipment that the public can buy to protect themselves is a form of physical protection.  
Food and water supplies are also important pieces of equipment.  
  In order to promote true defensive measures against biological weapons, the 
government could develop a packet to distribute with various kinds of information from 
bio-agents and what they do to how to seal up a house.  In addition, they should have 
facemasks and jumpsuits, plus other various items needed to weather a biological 
pandemic.  Their distribution would be fairly low cost and easily executed.  According to 
the FY2014 budget, civilian biodefense funding reached nearly $7 billion, where $6 
22 "Civil Defense Shelter Statement." Bulletin Of The Atomic Scientists 18, no. 2 (February 1962): 25 
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billion was allocated to “multiple use funding” with no allocation to specific programs or 
research.23  However, the funding allocation does not favor non-pharmaceutical medical 
equipment, but favors MCM development and biodefense research. For example, Project 
BioShield, a project to increase MCM development and testing received an increase of 
$250 million, where Hospital Preparedness Program, a program to assist in workforce 
development and training saw a decrease in $122.5 million from FY2013 levels.24 
 Physical protection through improvements to public, private infrastructure and 
government supplied safety packets could save many lives and allow for citizens to play 
an active role in mitigating a biological threat.  These methods as a form of biodefense 
are safe and defensive, opposed to offensive and possibly pre-emptive.  It would a more 
favorable practice for the government to invest in safer biological PPEs or non-
pharmaceutical medical interventions, rather than developing deadly pathogens or 
unnecessary MCMs.  The risk of one of the pathogens leaking and ending up in the 
wrong hands or infecting a laboratory worker, is far worse than having an abundance of 
PPE items. 
Research and Development 
 Research and Development in biodefense consists of creating and using viruses 
and bacteria, testing their effects, and finding a way to counter them.  Additionally, it also 
involves learning how these biological agents can be used to inflict harm on society, 
which means testing various methods for weaponizing and disseminating them, this 
process is formally known as research, development, testing and evaluation (RDT&E).  
However, as states prepare to stay ahead of biological weapons threats by developing 
23 Sell and Watson, p.200 
24 Ibid. p202 
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deadly strains of viruses and then anti-viral counters, many argue these efforts make us 
less safe and are the antithesis of any non-proliferation agreement. 25  Yet, others suggest 
that the ultimate safeguard against bioterrorism is knowing and understanding how 
biological agents will impact society and how to prevent an epidemic by expanding 
biodefense.26  However, both may be true it is important to understand the relationship 
between these two opposing views. This section will explore the various ideas on whether 
or not research and development by way of MCM result in greater biological weapons 
insecurity, by first exploring the pros and cons of the “dual-use” dilemma of bioresearch, 
specifically addressing the argument of proliferation or prevention based on states’ 
motivations and third, the obstacles of verification and compliance with research and 
developing medical countermeasures. 
Proliferation or Prevention 
In the tenth article of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) states that are 
part the convention have the right to research and develop biological agents for peaceful 
purposes.  This unique provision is due to the “dual-use” benefits biological research has.  
Dual-use refers to the societal benefits biological research has for finding cures and 
treatments to illness on one hand and it ability to create epidemics and weaponize viruses 
on the other.  For example, smallpox or the variola virus is still a highly contagious virus 
that can cause catastrophic death and disruption to public health systems and it was also 
one of the first viruses used as a weapon by the British against Native Americans.  
Although, bioresearch has given us a vaccine and the World Health Organization 
announced the eradication of smallpox in 1980, the virus lives on in two secure labs.  In 
25 Guillemin 2005; Klotz,Sylvester 2009; Preston 2007 
26 Koblentz 2009; Schneider 2004; Miller,Engelberg,Broad 2001 
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1993, 1995,1999, and 2002 the World Health Organization recommended the virus to be 
destroyed, but one view prevailed; the virus is beneficial to research and acts as a counter 
to bioterrorism.27 
Klotz and Sylvester assert that the dual-use designation by the bioresearch 
community is an opportunity to make medicine into better bioweapons.28 The National 
Research Council wrote a report titled, “Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism: 
Confronting the Dual-Use Dilemma,” which listed “experiments of concern.”  These 
experiments included: creating drug resistant viruses, and ineffective vaccines, enhancing 
the virulence of a pathogen, or create a pathogen that could go undetected.  These 
experiments are justified under the defensive dual use designation, which contributes to 
the view that biodefense encourages bioweapons proliferation making us less secure.29  
The dual-use dilemma generally concerns itself with how the development and research 
of deadly bio-agents will impact human health; this is a very obvious dilemma.  Yet, 
many ethical problems such as, right to life, animal rights, freedom of inquiry, human 
rights, and principles of utility and justice all contribute to this dilemma.   
The duality of biodefense medical countermeasures complicates non-proliferation 
efforts when uncooperative or rogue states claim bioresearch programs are for peaceful 
and defensive purposes.  North Korea and Iraq, for example, were suspected of storing 
the deadly smallpox virus and vaccinating their soldiers; this kind of action can signal 
that these countries plan to weaponize and use smallpox in combat and they are taking 
steps to protect their soldiers.30  Yet, this perception is similar to the United States 
27 Schneider 2004, 96-98 
28 Klotz and Sylvester, 2009, 1706 
29 Guillemin 2005, 18 
30 Schneider 2004, 99 
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vaccinating soldiers against anthrax before leaving for Korea or the Persian Gulf.31  
Thomas Preston claims that what is “offensive” or “defensive” in bioresearch is more 
about the intentions and motivations of the scientists and not the actual work being 
performed.32  In other words, the development of MCM is proliferation regardless of the 
preventative or defensive nature of the end product.  Similarly, Preston notes that the 
United States government would view their own program as being defensive and would 
be highly suspicious of it if it were being conducted by the Chinese, North Koreans or 
Iranians.33  Yet, Gregory Koblentz, an advocate for increasing biodefense programs 
admits that in order to conduct meaningful research, development, testing and evaluation 
on defensive strategy, a program has to have an offensive component to determine the 
defensive countermeasures. He also admits, there is a lot of “grey area” on what is 
permissible under the Biological Weapons Convention regarding a legitimate biological 
weapons biodefense program.34   
 Jeanne Guillemin suggests that biological weapons proliferation may be greater 
now than during any other time due to advances in biotechnology.  She also asserts that 
proliferation and use is inevitable and calls for greater international restraints.  However, 
these restraints are easily evaded due to the ease to which states can hide their 
bioweapons programs and claim offensive research for defensive purposes.  Yet, how are 
programs supposed to be legitimized as defensive if they are kept secret?  The Biological 
31 Schneider 2004, 70 
32 Preston 2007, 184 
33 Preston 2007, 185 
34 Koblentz 2009, 69 
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Weapons Convention requires signatories to declare legitimate defensive programs, but it 
is the illegitimate programs that remain secret and pose a problem.35  
 Biodefense medical countermeasures produce complicated “grey” areas for 
verifying legitimate defensive programs and maintaining genuine compliance with non-
proliferations agreements. The dual-use characteristics make it easy for states to hide 
their intentions and motivations by engaging in “defensive” RDT&E, which make 
compliance easy to claim.  However, declared and apparent biodefense programs operate 
under a level of secrecy in order to preserve their defensive strategy.  Koblentz suggests, 
“the premium for secrecy arises from the availability of medical countermeasures against 
specific biological agents and the potential for an adversary to create new medical 
countermeasures.”36  How is it then possible for non-proliferation agreements to provide 
a viable level of verification? In addition, to dual-use and secrecy, biodefense programs 
do not take up large sites like nuclear facilities do and can be disguised as a farm, a 
factory, or completely underground and out of site, which create further barriers in 
verification.  
 In 2001, the United States sealed the fate of any real verification and compliance 
protocols in the BWC by withdrawing from binding provisions. Since then the BWC has 
failed to develop or agree on verification and compliance mechanisms.  However, 
verification and compliance has hurdles without considering the dual-use dilemma: 1) 
there needs to be criteria on permitted activity; 2) quantity levels of a bio-agent need to 
be set; 3) export controls should be agreed on; 4) the use for each bio-agent to be 
declared; 5) a clear definition of what a biological weapon is needs to be decided on.  
35 Guillemin 2005, 188 
36 Koblentz 2009, 108 
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Without overcoming these hurdles verification and compliance will remain unresolved.37  
Additionally, none of the above actions can guarantee that biological weapons cannot 
find their way into the wrong hands, but they could possibly decrease the chances of 
highly sophisticated bioweapons from being stolen and used.  
 Dual-use, proliferation, and verification and compliance can all contribute to a 
multiplied threat caused by biodefense medical countermeasures.  However, the view of 
biodefense expansion contributing, as a threat multiplier is not shared by all and this 
paper will further elaborate on the effectiveness of biodefense as it relates to insecurity.  
Biodefense as an effective security strategy? 
 The previous sections have outlined what factors make up biodefense and provide 
a clear framework on the challenges and opportunities posed by biodefense expansion.  
With the increase in technology and bioresearch comes the opportunity to find cures for 
some of the most pressing public health problems.  Additionally, vaccines and medical 
countermeasures for some of the most dangerous viruses can be made.  However, does 
biodefense keep us safe or does it encourage bioweapons proliferation?  The next section 
will analyze the biodefense program in the United States during the 2001 Anthrax 
Letters.  By using the criteria previously outlined, it will examine whether or not 
biodefense efforts created vulnerabilities in keeping the public safe and whether the 
strategies employed were effective.  Based on the previous analysis of biodefense 
strategies, current biodefense expansion has caused difficulty in monitoring and 
compliance.  The dual-use characteristic of bioresearch has made us less safe, 
encouraging states to develop secret biological weapons programs without the normal 
oversights and protections.    
37 Chevrier 1995 
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Methodology 
 In order to examine whether or not biodefense strategies are effective in 
maintaining national security objectives and reducing the risk of biological weapons use 
and proliferation, the paper will dissect biodefense spending and strategies post 9/11.  In 
his 2004 Presidential Directive-10, “Biodefense for the 21st Century,” then President 
George W. Bush outlined the future of U.S. biodefense strategy. Directive 10 focused on 
four essential pillars, namely; threat awareness, prevention and protection, surveillance 
and detection, and response and recovery.38 These pillars have remained a consistent 
framework for U.S. biodefense policy. However, funding and allocation of resources has 
determined the focus and priorities of administrations and U.S. policy.39  
Biodefense spending in the United States pre-September 11, 2001 and pre-
Anthrax Letters shows a very significant gap when compared to after 2001.  Following 
the flow of money allows for an accurate look into the priorities of top government 
administrators and departments. After the 2001 Antrax Letters, the Bush administration 
requested emergency funding of $1.5 billion for countering bioterrorism, which the 
congress increased to $2.5 billion.  Biodefense saw a 1,500 percent increase from 2001 to 
38 The Executive Office of the President, “Biodefense for the 21st Century,” Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 10/HSPD-10, April 28, 2004. 
39 Conflicting views of bioterrorism and the breadth of the federal biodefense effort, which crosses 
congressional committee, complicates congressional oversight of the overall biodefense enterprise. 
Between G.W.Bush and Barrack Obama several Presidential Executive Orders and Directives have been 
issued to sort out the biodefense responsibilities across the U.S. government. Related directives and 
executive orders are: Executive Order 13527, “Establishing Federal Capability for the Timely Provision of 
Medical Countermeasures Following a Biological Attack,” 75 Federal Register 737-738, January 6, 2010; 
National Security Council, Executive Office of the President, National Strategy for Countering Biological 
Threats, November 2009 and Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, “Executive Order—
Optimizing the Security of Biological Select Agents and Toxins in the United States,” July 2, 2010. The 
federal government has also tested its capabilities through exercises responding to bioterrorism. 
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2006.40  By tracking which government agencies received the larger portions of funding 
one can also assume what type of biodefense strategy the government was interested in 
employing.  Although, spending does not correlate to effectiveness it can indicate 
methods to prevent, detect, mitigate and treat. 











Source: Tara Kirk Sell and Matthew Watson. Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, 
Practice, and Science. 
 
 
 In Figure 1, biodefense funding refers to programs that are entirely funded for 
prevention, preparedness, and the mitigation of deliberate biological threats.  However, 
multiuse funding is still funding designated for biodefense, but is categorized as areas 
that improve biodefense by contributing to science, public health, healthcare, and national 
40 Tara Kirk Sell and Matthew Watson. Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and 
Science. September 2013, 11(3): p.200-203 
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security.41  Literature suggests biodefense includes methods to prevent, detect, mitigate, 
and treat incidents of biological weapons use.  Prevention consists of efforts that will 
limit or deter the use and impacts of a biological agent and control its ability to inflict 
mass chaos, death or cause widespread psychological damages.  These preventative 
measures usually consist of intelligence collection, biosurveillance, built infrastructure, 
health workforce training and public health improvements.  Measures to detect have a 
preventative function, however, many detection efforts rely on catching an actor in the 
act or provide a safety net when an actor has attempted or made the decision to use a 
biological agent as a weapon on civil society.  These efforts often refer to devises, 
sensors, disease monitoring, and public awareness.  Mitigation refers to any measures 
used to lessen the impact of a deadly biological agent after they have been used.42  These 
measures range from medical countermeasures to public safety campaigns.  Treating the 
incident has been the focus of many biodefense strategies.  The research and development 
of bio-agents to create vaccinations or antivirals is an overarching objective in many of 
the strategies in biodefense policies.  In the 2009 National Health Security Strategy, one 
strategic objective calls for an “effective countermeasure enterprise,” referring to a large 
stockpile of antivirals, drugs, and vaccines, in addition to conducting extensive research 
to develop such medical countermeasures (MCM).43  However, it is important to 
understand the definitional nuances between biosecurity and biodefense.  Biosecurity as 
defined by the White House’s Office of Science and Technology Policy as, “the 
protection, control of, and accountability for high-consequence biological agents and 
41 Ibid. 1, p.199 
42 Gregory Koblentz, the Deputy Director of the Biodefense Graduate Program at George Mason 
University and author of Living Weapons: Biological Warfare and International Security 
43 2009 National Health Security Strategy 
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toxins, and critical relevant biological materials and information within laboratories to 
prevent unauthorized possession, loss, theft, misuse, diversion, or intentional release.”44  
In various studies of biodefense and biosecurity these terms have been used 
interchangeably to the detriment of clarity.  In an effort to provide a clear analysis on the 
effectiveness of biodefense strategies, this analysis will focus on biodefense as a broad 
defensive strategy to counter the intentional use of biological weapons.  However, 
biosecurity will be mentioned when explaining various domestic policies in 
implementing a biodefense strategy, particularly in safeguarding against and responding 
to both naturally occurring and engineered biological threats stemming from accidents.   
In order to examine how these methods are factored into biodefense strategy and 
how this relationship influences security, this study will use and elaborate on Koblentz’s 
categories of biodefense strategies namely medical countermeasures, surveillance, and 
physical protection.45  Since any strategy to prevent or stop the creation, use, and impact 
of a biological weapon are technically medical countermeasures, this paper will 
categorize them as  research and development.  However, one of the major critiques of 
biodefense strategies is that there are no concrete strategies for implementing and 
defining biodefense measures.46  Therefore, the measures that Koblentz lays out provide 
the best foundation and most comprehensive framework for assessing biodefense 
strategy.   
To begin, this study will focus on biodefense in its varying degrees of defensive 
effectiveness based on the biodefense methods previously mentioned, prevent, detect, 
mitigate and treat.  Even though all biodefense strategies consist of these methods some 
44 White House’s Office of Science and Technology Policy 
45 Koblentz (2009, 28) 
46 Guillemin 2011, 256 
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employ other methods more than others, assuming that prevention is the most effective 
defensive method for protecting the public.  The study  will begin with examining states’ 
monitoring and detection systems, specifically, workforce training, bio-surveillance 
databases used to identify dangerous bio-agents, and research facilities oversight;  
Followed by physical protection strategies, from public infrastructure and private 
investments to basic emergency equipment  distribution.  Lastly, it will look at research 
and development.  Research and development strategies are generally medical and 
scientific in nature and consist of developing vaccines and antibiotics in the form of 
medical countermeasures (MCM) that will serve as cures or preventative safeguards 
against weaponized bio-agents.  However, this section will also address the dual-use 
dilemma of bioresearch and the Biological Weapons Convention’s verification and 
compliance challenges due to the dual-use designation of many programs.  All three of 
these strategies create a comprehensive breakdown of the larger biodefense strategy.  
Whether a balanced collection of all three factors or an aggressive, dominate approach 
with one, it is the aim of this paper to examine the effectiveness of these strategies within 
the broader biodefense strategy in keeping the public safe from intentional biological 
weapons use. 
Ultimately, these categories will provide a methodological framework for 
discussing bioweapons security implications in an age of robust biodefense programs.  
Expressed representationally if bD=biodefense, mC= medical countermeasures, m= 
monitoring, p=physical protections, and nS=national security then bD(mC+m+p)=nS.  
Given this equation, an increase in mC, m, and p will increase bD contributing also to an 
increase in nS; or an expansion of defense strategies will increase biodefense and 
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therefore increase outcomes in national security.  Note that this equation is symbolic and 
does not have the quantitative backing to measure the exact outcome of security based on 
these variables and it is a representational expression of a hypothesis.  Drawing on the 
basic inference of this equation, I will examine the biodefense policies during the 2001 
Anthrax Letters attack as a way to show the effectiveness of each category on national 
security. 
Case Study 
Amerithrax: The 2001 Anthrax Letters 
The 2001 Anthrax Letters case study will not focus on the legal story and 
investigation, rather it focus more on the biodefense program and many of the systemic 
problems stemming from biodefense programs and the insecurity they posed during this 
time.  The analysis of the 2001 Anthrax Letters is organized by first focusing on the 
previously formulated equation bD(mC,m,p)=nS and expanding on the biodefense 
strategies employed by the United States.  First, it will look at research and development 
strategies during pre-911.  Second, it will examine the monitoring and detection factors 
employed during that time at facilities handling dangerous bio-agents.  Additionally, it 
will discuss surveillance systems in labs, on scientists handling deadly pathogens and the 
pathogens themselves.  Third, it will look at the physical protection measures in place to 
handle the victims and the public facilities, specifically, the process that officials took to 
clean and process congressional offices, postal offices, hospitals, and victims’ homes. 
At the time of the attacks, U.S. officials did not know if the attacks had been an 
act of terror promoted by a non-state actor or a rogue state.  This question alone gave the 
intelligence community their starting point; find out where the weapons grade anthrax 
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came from.  Initial analysis supported the claim that the anthrax used was too 
sophisticated to be from a basement effort with a basic understanding of biology, 
therefore they believed that it was from a state program.  After six years of investigation 
the analysis verified that the anthrax originated from Ames strain of Bacillus anthracis 
that later reveled RMR-1029 found at USAMRIID was the source for the weapons grade 
anthrax in the 2001 letters.  This led to two American scientists is suspects for 
propagating homegrown bioterror.47  
Leading up to October 2001 there were three known sites that produced anthrax 
and worked with dry spores: Battelle, Dugway, and DRES, and their associate labs and 
subcontractors.  Battelle is known to have routinely used dry spores for experiments on 
aerosol capabilities in biodefense research.  Dugway is known to have produced anthrax 
in a powder form a few years before 2001.  They also produced the anthrax found in flask 
RMR-1029 at the U.S. Army’s Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases 
(USAMRIID), the flask that is suspected to have supplied the anthrax letters.  Battelle 
and Dugway work together in several locations and have shared materials, in addition to 
sharing materials with others, including RMR 1029 with “private” facilities for 
“legitimate purposes”.48   
After the attack members of the U.S. Congress agreed that bioterrorism was a real 
threat and made civil biodefense a priority, emphasizing biomedical protection.  In 2002 
the budget for defense against bioterrorism increased to over $3 billion dollars, which 
was just in the millions during the Clinton Administration.  With fear driving the strategy 
behind the biodefense funding, large amounts were allocated to research on anthrax, 
47 FBI, 2010 
48 Hugh-Jones, et al. 2011 
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smallpox, plague and other pathogens.  Additionally, high-containment laboratories were 
also built to protect the research on these various pathogens.  The Strategic National 
Stockpile, a repository of antibiotics, vaccines, and critical medical equipment and 
supplies, which provided supplies after the anthrax letters attack also, received a 
significant increase in funding from $81 million in 2001 to $1.157 billion in 2002.49  
Laboratories with a biosafety level 4 (BSL-4), the highest level of safety tripled 
from 2001 to 2008.  Now, 15 of these BSL-4 laboratories all around our country are 
responsible for conducting research on the most dangerous pathogens.   
Research and Development 
 At least 22 victims contracted anthrax as a result of the mailings.  Eleven 
individuals contracted inhalational anthrax by inhaling Bacillus anthracis spores and 
another 11 suffered anthrax by absorbing it through the skin.  Five of the inhalational 
victims died from their infections: Robert Stevens, 63, photo editor, AMI, Boca Raton, 
Florida, died on October 5, 2001; Thomas L. Morris, Jr., 55, postal worker, Brentwood 
Post Office, Washington, D.C., died on October 21, 2001; Joseph P. Curseen, Jr., 47, 
postal worker, Brentwood Post Office, Washington, D.C., died on October 22, 2001; 
Kathy T. Nguyen, 61, hospital employee, New York City, died on October 31, 2001; and 
Ottilie Lundgren, 94, Oxford, Connecticut, died on November 21, 2001.  Another 31 
people tested positive for exposure to anthrax spores. Ten thousand more people, deemed 
“at risk” from possible exposure and were treated with an antibiotic prophylaxis.50  
Without the research of anthrax and the development of a treatment many more people 
would have died and the impact would have been much more severe.  However, many 
49 Guillemin 2011, 125 
50 FBI, 2010 
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contest that if the United States had not been stockpiling a dangerous pathogen like 
RMR-1029 then this event would not have taken place.  The threat from the anthrax 
letters was not exclusively dependent on the availability of anthrax, but the concern is 
that biodefense makes us less secure by proliferating biological agents that could 
potentially serve as biological weapons. 
 The threat of biological weapons is not overstated or exaggerated and there is a 
need to think of ways to safely counter their impacts.  Yet, with all the funding going to 
developing new ways to counter deadly pathogens people are still at risk.  In September 
2009, a scientist at the University of Chicago, researching a vaccine for the plague died 
after being accidentally infected with the disease.  Accidents will happen and there are 
few biodefense strategies that can prevent human error from happening.  This was the 
thinking behind a community in Kansas’ fight against a BSL-4 lab that would be 
potentially researching highly contagious foot-and-mouth disease.  The community is 
home to 10% of the United States’ cattle industry and an outbreak would devastate the 
economy and cost billions in damages.  
Monitoring and Detection 
During the 2001 Anthrax Letters much of the delivery system for disseminating 
the pathogen was not a sophisticated aerosol device or a highly engineered warhead; 
rather it was an American postal worker unaware of the dangerous spore hidden in what 
appeared to be everyday first-class mail.  The ease to which this attack impacted national 
security is still today an embarrassment.  Yet, most of the funding for biodefense is still 
being allocated to research and development and not securing the facilities and 
monitoring the scientists involved in the work.  For example, in 2008 the General 
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Accountability Office told Congress that, no particular federal agency could identify the 
exact number of BSL-3 Laboratories.  In addition, in university labs as well as some 
private labs funded by government grants, scientists are not subject to security clearances 
or background checks.  During the 2001 Anthrax Letters, one important detail remains; 
the number one suspect is the scientist that worked inside the lab.   
Knowing this simple fact makes pumping money into more opportunities for 
developing deadly pathogens so a “mad scientist” can threaten national security seem like 
a bad policy.  Instead we should be tightening our monitoring and detection systems and 
making improvements to physical infrastructure.  The Department of Homeland Security 
turned to surveillance as its antidote to bioterrorism installing a BioWatch program that 
relies on air sensors to monitor 30 U.S. cities for deadly pathogens.  During the 2001 
Anthrax Letters, two of the people that died and hundreds that were treated came from 
the United States Postal Service (USPS).  After the attacks USPS installed real-time 
Biohazard Detection Systems (BDS).  This type of monitoring will save lives without 
creating more opportunity to put more at risk.   
Collecting data and analyzing it to create models and forestall and foresee 
bioterrorism threats is an ideal use of the technological advances.  Additionally, one of 
the primary defenses against bioterrorism is intelligence.  President Obama, addressing 
the bioterrorism issue said, “enhanced intelligence to thwart bioterrorist incidents” was 
the best approach against an attack.51   
51 Guillemin 2011, 260; Further President Obama stated, “And we are launching a new initiative that will 
give us the capacity to respond faster and more effectively to bioterrorism or an infectious disease—a 
plan that will counter threats at home and strengthen public health abroad.” Office of the Press Secretary, 
The White House, Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address, January 27, 2010. This new 
initiative focused heavily on intelligence sharing and gathering of bioterrorism. For example, the National 
Counterterrorism Center established a working group on chemical, biological ,radiological, nuclear 
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Physical Protection 
 During the Clinton Administration key government buildings had been equipped 
with ventilation systems to protect against biological agents.  Yet, the congressional 
offices targeted by the anthrax letters were not protected.  Physical protections are a key 
strategy in biodefense, yet, very little has been done to promote retrofitting all 
government buildings and large private skyscrapers with HEPA filters and possible 
sensors.  As mentioned before retrofitting buildings with HEPA filters would be low cost 
and would provide protection against a massive airborne attack on a skyscraper.  
 Billions have been spent in building high-containment laboratories, but in August 
2005, Hurricane Katrina flooded a Galveston BSL-4 lab causing scientists to leave deadly 
microbes unsecure for days.  Officials reassured residents that no harm was done, but this 
raises the issue supported in 2001 that public awareness and response to incidences are 
severely overlooked.  The public will need to understand what to do during the time of a 
massive bioterror attack or a bio-agent leak from a BSL-4 laboratory.  Similar to the any 
natural disaster response, the government should encourage a biological disaster kit that 
would include facemasks, filters, water and a public health action plan on what one 
should do; much like earthquake preparedness kits and first-aid kits.  
Conclusion 
  In October of 2001, seven letters containing weapons grade anthrax was 
delivered to two Senate offices and five major news media outlets.  These seven letters 
contaminated multiple facilities that cost the United States approximately $6 billion in 
damages and five individuals their lives.  The psychological impact of this attack still 
counterterrorism. CRS Report R41022, The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)—Responsibilities and 
Potential Congressional Concerns, by Richard A. Best Jr.  
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guides policy and drives the justification for biodefense expansion.  Security measures 
have been introduced and suggested far beyond the scope that this incident evolved.  
During fiscal year 2010 to 2011 the United States spent roughly $879 billion on 
biodefense for the Department of Homeland Security and $663 billion in the form of 
countermeasure research and development.52   
The previously stated question as to whether national biodefense strategies are 
effective in maintaining national security objectives to safeguard against biological 
attacks can be answered with the following conclusions. Biodefense research and 
development on medical countermeasures is a strategy that creates the greatest insecurity. 
The equation presented earlier in this paper suggested that an increase in any of the 
strategy measures contributed to an increase in biodefense and subsequently increased 
national security regardless of what that strategy measure was.  This is flawed based on 
the observation that medical countermeasures proliferate dangerous pathogens at the risk 
of causing a pandemic or encouraging other states to counter others’ medical 
countermeasures’ research, which create secret biodefense programs that can’t be 
monitored.  From this case study we see that not all biodefense strategies are created 
equally and that it may be too simplistic to declare biodefense causes insecurity.  We 
have seen how many factors make up biodefense and the various outcomes each has.  
Yet, there are particular strategies that multiply threats and others that are truly defensive 
in nature.  The 2001 Anthrax Letters provide a great narrative for explaining this complex 
relationship for at least two reasons. One, the case is still inconclusive due to many of the 
reasons that make biological weapons very dangerous and two, the impact it had on 
national security spending in biodefense. 
52 Franco, Sell, 2010 
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Through this analysis, it is conclusive that proliferating biological weapons for the 
sake of defensive strategies is not the path toward security.  Governments should work 
together to bring biodefense programs out of obscurity and secrecy.  The dual-use 
dilemma of biodefense is due to states dishonest practices and misrepresenting their 
intentions.  Once we reveal the true nature of biodefense by actually engaging in 
measures that will defend, like retrofitting buildings with HEPA filters and sensors, 
increase intelligence collection and analysis, and invest in public preparedness and 
response, we will be better off.   
The 2001 Anthrax Letters teaches us a lot about what went wrong in our security, 
but we are making the same mistakes and in some sense increasing the potential for a 
bigger problem.  Plainly stated, we are less secure with the current biodefense strategy.  
Its effectiveness has not been proven and throughout this paper it has explained that the 
United States is promoting biodefense strategies that are creating insecurity and are not 


















Biological agents as we know them today have been the source of much concern 
since civilization can record.  Illnesses wiped out populations without any effort and 
forced humans to quickly adapt to their changing environment, whether by scientific 
breakthrough or quarantine.  Yet, it was not until man learned how to use these illnesses 
as a tool that biological weapons were first invented.53  We now live in a time where 
biological weapons are considered a ‘weapon of mass destruction’ (WMD).54  Although, 
modern medicine has brought about the possibilities to mitigate the impact of a variety of 
biological agents, and modern-day society has not experienced the impact of a biological 
weapon with mass destructive possibilities, the WMD designation still holds up.  The aim 
of this paper is not to question the designation, but to add specific analysis for explaining 
why biological weapons are or are not a threat.  
The Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation 
and Terrorism of 2008 suggested, the next large terror attack on the United States would 
likely be carried out using a biological weapon and before 2013, if we did not take the 
appropriate steps to safeguard against bioterrorism.55  2013 has come and gone without a 
53 Koster, John. "Smallpox in the Blankets." Wild West 25, no. 2 (August 2012): 36. (accessed Feb.  4, 
2013). 
54 Joint Publication 3–40, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: JCS, June 10, 2009), 
iii–iv, mentions the adoption of a new definition; see also GL–6; available at 
www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_40.pdf  
55 Graham, Bob, James M. Talent, and Graham T Allison. World At Risk: The Report of the Commission On 
the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism. New York: Vintage Books, 2008. 
http://www.absa.org/leg/WorldAtRisk.pdf p. xv 
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major terrorist attack since 9/11 and especially not one involving biological weapons.  
Which leads to the question; have experts in the field of bioterrorism and biodefense 
convinced the public that the threats from biological weapons pose greater dangers to 
society than they actually do?  Or did the commission’s recommendations get 
implemented in time to prevent a large-scale biological weapons attack?  Whatever the 
reason, this study seeks to understand the relationship between deadly biological agents 
and violent terrorist organizations and how this dangerous couple became one of the 
leading national security threats post-WWII.  Yet, a more important question given this 
potential threat is; why the United States has not experienced a large scale, biological 
weapons attack by a non-state actor in the post WWII era? 
In order to address why the United States has not experienced a large scale, 
biological weapons attack by a non-state actor in the post WWII era, this study will 
examine various themes on technological advancements in biotechnology and the 
methods of operation and organizational structure of terrorist groups.  More specifically, 
it will apply; revolutionary versus evolutionary based narratives on the threats posed by 
biological agents; second, it uses this information to examine technology’s influence on 
terrorist organizations’ weapons choice; finally, the study will compare terrorist 
organization structure and terrorists’ method of operation to create a concise profile of 
the most likely bioterrorist.  By synthesizing this information, it will provide a concise 
model for explaining why non-state actors have not used biological weapons in a large-
scale attack.   
Literature Review  
Gregory Koblentz, Deputy Director of the Biodefense Graduate Program at 
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George Mason University said it best, “biological weapons present a number of 
paradoxes and dilemmas. They are widely feared, yet rarely used.”56  There are a lot of 
conflicting points concerning the difficulty to which biological agents can be acquired, 
the amount of damage biological weapons can do, and the appeal of biological weapons 
to meet terrorists’ objectives in future attacks.  These points contribute to understanding 
if weaponized biological agents are a threat to global security and should be considered a 
weapon of mass destruction (WMD).  The arguments within these conflicting points can 
be categorized into two camps; 1) biological weapons are a threat, 2) biological weapons 
are not a threat.  However, there are those that make up a third camp that claim a certain 
set of criteria determines the threat biological weapons can pose, such as: bioagent used, 
amount, a group’s motivation, intention, etc.  For example, Kortepeter and Parker, 
researchers at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases in Fort 
Detrick claim, that at the most dangerous end of the spectrum are large groups that are 
well funded and generally supported by a state.57  These types of groups pose the greatest 
threat due to access, resources, and capabilities.  However, historically, groups that have 
used biological agents as weapons have been smaller, non-state actors with specific 
targets and in some cases lone-wolf terrorists with no organizational affiliation.58  
Although, the third camp provides important analysis on the varying degrees of 
danger posed by biological weapons based on several conditions and factors, the other 
two camps provide the foundation for establishing the nature of the designation, threat.  
56 Koblentz, Gregory D., Living Weapons: Biological Warfare and International Security. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2009. p. 228 
57 Kortepeter, Mark G., and Gerald W. Parker. "Potential Biological Weapons Threats." Emerging Infectious 
Diseases 5, no. 4 (July 1999): 523-527. Academic Search Complete. p.525 
58 Rajneesh in Oregon and 2001 Anthrax letter attacks. Gerstein, Daniel M., Bioterror In the 21st Century: 
Emerging Threats In a New Global Environment. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2009.  
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For example, nuclear weapons are a dangerous threat regardless of who processes them; 
however, the threat from a biological agent depends on the knowledge of its user and the 
virulence of the causal agent. Without proper knowledge of handling and weaponizing, 
the user runs the risk of self-infection and inoperability. 
Biological Agents: A Threat  
As part of the first camp that believes biological weapons are correctly designated 
a threat and a WMD, Gerald Epstein suggests that biological weapons will continue to 
become more of a threat due to the lack of preparedness in U.S. response systems and 
their inability to manage an epidemic caused by the use of biological agents.  He 
highlights the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Proliferation and Terrorism’s failed predictions on a major biological weapons attack, but 
cautions that the lack of an attack does not negate the actual threat of biological weapons 
by being unprepared and that the U.S. government needs to continue to be alert and ready 
for an epidemic caused by a dangerous biological weapon.59  Jeanne Guillemin, a 
medical anthropologist and authority on biological weapons, echoes the warnings from 
others that biological weapons pose an asymmetrical threat to unprotected civilians and 
are a very real “weapon of mass destruction” based on the notion that like a nuclear 
weapon, biological weapons indiscriminately kill all beings.60  Falkenrath, Newman and 
Thayer suggest biological weapons pose the greatest threat due to their suitability for 
covert attacks and ability to spread as a pandemic.  Gerstein highlights the 21st century’s 
development of globalization as biological weapon’s threat multiplier due to the 
59 Epstein, Gerald L. "Biosecurity 2011: Not a year to change minds." Bulletin Of The Atomic Scientists 68, 
no. 1 (January 2012): 29-38. Academic Search Complete. 
60 Guillemin, Jeanne, Biological Weapons: From the Invention of State-Sponsored Programs to 
Contemporary Bioterrorism. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005.  
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communicable properties of some biological agents.61 Furthermore, supporting Gerstein’s 
claim, Zimmerman in Killer Germs, elaborates on the history and dangers that various 
germs, viruses and infectious diseases have had and continue to have on human 
populations as well as other species.  Zimmerman conveys a serious problem with 
bioterrorism based on the premise that biological agents are deadly regardless of how 
they’re introduction to a population.  
Even though there are many scholars and experts that believe biological weapons 
are a threat irrespective of conditions, the argument against them still persists.  As part of 
the second camp that doesn’t believe biological weapons are a threat, Susan Wright 
expresses the notion that biological weapons have become an overblown, sensationalized 
and political issue.62  She references several failed attempts by non-state actors to use 
biological agents to harm civilian populations to illustrate the low impact of each attempt 
and the exaggerated response.  Milton Leitenberg supports Wright’s research and adds 
that the threat in biological weapons is from large, secretive, defensive programs that are 
run by states and that the focus on terrorist organizations seeking to use biological agents 
is misguided.  He claims that terrorist groups, al-Qaeda included, do not have biological 
weapons capabilities or the capacity to genetically engineer their own agents.63 
Biotechnology and Terrorism 
Kathleen Vogel, frames the threats from biological agents into greater context by 
dividing these two camps, not into believers and none believers, but into two 
61 Gerstein, DanieI M. "BIOTERROR in the AGE of BIOTECHNOLOGY." JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly no. 57 
(2010 2nd Quarter 2010): 78-85. Academic Search Complete. p.83 
62 Wrigth, Susan. "TAKING BIODEFENSE TOO FAR." Bulletin Of The Atomic Scientists 60, no. 6 (November 
2004): 58-66. Academic Search Complete. 
63 Leitenberg, Milton, James Leonard, and Richard Spertzel. "Biodefense crossing the line." Politics And 
The Life Sciences 22, no. 2 (September 2003): 2-3. OmniFile Full Text Mega (H.W. Wilson). 
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technologically driven narratives, biotech revolution and biotech evolution.  Vogel 
claims, a revolution-based approach is the current understanding of the intelligence 
community and policy makers.64 She refers to four principles in Gerald Epstein’s 
hypothesis on the revolution approach that biotechnology is growing in power, widely 
available, more familiar, and more decentralized.65 These principles lead to overblown 
and frightening assumptions regarding the capabilities of terrorist organizations and the 
possibilities of high impact biological weapons.  Conversely, the evolution-based 
approach considers complex social, economic, scientific and technical problems that 
shape and influence scientific developments.  She relates commercial sector biotechnical 
advancement barriers to biological weapons development barriers and further suggests 
that assumptions or analyses that do not include evolution-based considerations are not 
reasonable.  Vogel suggests the revolution narrative proponents view technology as the 
primary driver for increased bioterrorism and that terrorists will exploit modern biotech 
advancements, lowering the technical bar giving rise to greater vulnerabilities.  However, 
she references historical record to show that terrorist organizations have not demonstrated 
their technical aptitude or desire for biological weapons.66 
Brian Jackson and David Frelinger explore technology’s influence on terrorists’ 
weapons choices and targets.  At the crux of their argument, they suggest terrorists are 
not averse to using technology, but want the ‘most bang for their buck.’  Most serious 
terrorist organizations want the output and versatility in their weapons in order to meet or 
exceed the technological and resource investment it takes to acquire the weapon.  In their 
64 Vogel, Kathleen M. "Intelligent assessment: Putting emerging biotechnology threats in context." Bulletin 
Of The Atomic Scientists 69, no. 1 (January 2013): 43. MasterFILE Premier. 
65 Ibid. 7, p.29 
66 Vogel, Kathleen M. "Intelligent assessment: Putting emerging biotechnology threats in context." Bulletin 
Of The Atomic Scientists 69, no. 1 (January 2013): 43-52. Academic Search Complete. 
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analysis they focus on terrorist organization structure, targets, intention and time as 
influencing factors on terrorist decisions on technology.67  
Echoing this claim made by Jackson and Frelinger, James Forest suggests, 
terrorists want a guaranteed level of operational success from weapons.  He further 
explains that as weapons become more costly, complicated to acquire, transport, and 
operationalize, terrorist expect more for the hassle.  Biological weapons in this context 
does not meet the ‘probability of success’ that terrorist expect for the technical 
complexity.68 
Organizational Structure and Methods of Operation 
Gerstein succinctly categorizes terrorist organizations into three distinct groups; 
traditional, waning, and apocalyptic. He explains that traditional terrorists use violence to 
specifically pursue their political objectives and are responsive to the favor of their 
support base. Second, waning terrorist groups start out using violence to pursue political 
objectives, but slowly move away from violence and become more of a political entity. 
Finally, apocalyptic terrorist operate under a violent and mass casualty ideology with no 
regard for adversarial retribution or constituent support.69 
Gerstein claims that terrorist groups generally fit into the traditional or waning 
categories. The apocalyptic terrorists are a lot less frequent; yet, they are the most 
threatening of the three groups mainly because their actions are not influenced by the 
67 Jackson, Brian A., and David A. Frelinger. "Rifling Through the Terrorists' Arsenal: Exploring Groups' 
Weapon Choices and Technology Strategies." Studies In Conflict And Terrorism 31, no. 7 (July 2008): 583-
604. OmniFile Full Text Mega (H.W. Wilson). 
68 Forest, James J. F. "Framework for Analyzing the Future Threat of WMD Terrorism." Journal Of Strategic 
Security 5, no. 4 (Winter2012 2012): 51-68. International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center, 
EBSCOhost (accessed May 5, 2013). 
69 Gerstein, Daniel M., Bioterror In the 21st Century: Emerging Threats In a New Global Environment. 
Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2009. 
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approval from their base and in many instances extreme uses of violence at the risk of 
their own lives are acceptable.70  Although the research suggests these groups are most 
likely to use WMD because of their undiscerning ability to kill, Peter Phillips explains, 
the life-cycle of apocalyptic terror organizations are short-lived.  He suggests that an 
organization’s life span is linked to its grassroots support, the more support the longer a 
terrorist organization can be sustained.  Phillips also claims that terror organizations 
compete with governments for grassroots support and this determines the intensity of 
violence.71  
Gerstein’s categories can be further distilled with Medina and Hepner’s 
explanation of how terrorist groups organize.  Like most organizations, terrorist 
organizations also operate under a structure.  Medina and Hepner claim there are three 
general structures – hierarchical, decentralized, and leaderless resistance and multiple 
leaders models. They explain that leaderless resistance and many leaders models can be 
forms of advanced decentralization where individuals have no social connections to 
authoritative figures in the organization and are led by an idea, or a network in which the 
authoritative figures multiply to control specific regions where new hierarchies are 
created.72  
They also add that decentralized terrorist organizations can make for a more 
dangerous and efficient terrorist network structure.  For example, branches, cells, and 
agents that don’t communicate with network leadership can lose track of intended 
organizational goals. Their research highlights evidence that decentralized terrorist 
70 Ibid.  
71 Phillips, Peter. "The Life Cycle of Terrorist Organizations." International Advances In Economic Research 
17, no. 4 (November 2011): 369. p.374 
72 Medina, Richard M., and George F. Hepner. "Advancing the Understanding of Sociospatial 
Dependencies in Terrorist Networks." Transactions In GIS 15, no. 5 (October 2011): 577-597. p. 579 
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networks may be led by less ‘professional’ terrorists, and while these terrorists are 
dangerous, the majority of them may not have the resources required to inflict major 
damages.73  
Lone-wolf terrorist can be classified as decentralized. Helfstein claims, lone wolf 
terrorists work within a pragmatic strategy based on resources, geography, targets, 
objective, and motives.74  Ramon Spaaij, in his assessment of lone wolf terrorists, 
suggests that although lone wolf terrorists work and act alone they may sympathize and 
subscribe to a larger ideology where they derive support from others that also subscribe 
to a broader political or religious ideology.75 According to Spaaij, the most common 
choice of weaponry for lone wolf terrorists is firearms, explosives, and armed hijackings.  
He suggests that this fact is indicative of their resources and acquisition.76 Spaaij also 
highlights that lone wolf terrorists are not likely to use unconventional weapons, such as; 
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.  Yet, Walter Laqueur claims that lone wolf 
terrorists are most likely to use WMDs to advance their agenda because they have the 
least to lose.77 
Facts Tested by History 
Furthermore, Falkenrath and Newman claim that non-state actors are not 
interested in using biological weapons for five reasons including: 1) mass casualties do 
not serve non-state actors objectives, 2) does not increase coercive power, 3) increased 
73 Ibid. 
74 Helfstein, Scott. "Governance of Terror: New Institutionalism and the Evolution of Terrorist 
Organizations." Public Administration Review (Washington, D.C.) 69, no. 4 (July 2009): 727-739. p. 735 
75 Spaaij, Ramon. "The Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism: An Assessment." Studies In Conflict & Terrorism 
33, no. 9 (September 2010): 854-870. p.855 
76 Ibid. p. 856 
77 Walter Laqueur, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999), p. 269. 
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violence equates to a decrease support for the cause, 4) there are additional risks and 
challenges in acquiring deadly agents, 5) there is a risk in receiving stronger 
countermeasures and retaliation.  They suggest that history supports their theory by 
pointing out that no non-state actor has successfully used a biological weapon.78 
Conclusions from the Literature 
The research consulted has addressed key themes that will help address the 
broader question as to why the United States has not experienced a large-scale biological 
weapons attack during the past half century, post-WWII?  Answering this question 
requires understanding the argument underlining whether or not biological weapons are 
in fact a threat worthy of being called a ‘weapon of mass destruction.’ These arguments 
can be neatly categorized into two narratives; revolutionary and evolutionary. These 
narratives help explain biotechnology as it relates to bioterrorism and the general 
perception experts and scholars have regarding its threat on society.  The fusing of threat, 
technology and terrorism highlights the use and adaptation of technology by terrorists or 
terrorist organizations and how this influences their attacks.  However, this requires an 
in-depth understanding of terrorist organization typology and further methods of 
operation. 
Additionally, these themes allow for a general hypothesis leading to a preliminary 
answer of the previous question: why has the United States not experienced a large-scale 
biological weapons attack during the half century, post-WWII? Stated simply, bioagents 
are complex organisms that require advanced understanding of biotechnology and 
engineering to effectively weaponize them into a WMD and this understanding is 
78 Falkenrath, Robert A., Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer. America’s Achilles’ Heel: Nuclear, 
Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999). p.37-58 
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currently beyond the advancements of modern biotechnology.  Further, terrorists are 
conservative in their weapons choice and are in some cases sensitive to blowback, either 
from their support base or severe retaliation from their target.  Therefore, our general 
assessment of bioweapons does not suit the terrorist or the terrorists’ objective.  
Methodology 
World War II marked a significant shift in the way governments and the public 
viewed biological weapons (BW).  Biological weapons programs discovered after the war 
in Japan, Germany and the Soviet Union provided the evidence necessary to persuade 
world leaders that biological agents could cause as much human loss and destruction as 
conventional weapons and should be categorized as weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD). 79  However, it was not until after the Cold War that states started to abandoned 
biological weapons programs and focused on defensive measures, such as, creating 
vaccines and anti-virals.80 
The common perception among leaders in regards to biological weapons was 
second-strike capabilities provided enough deterrence against biological weapon armed 
states.  However, the more pressing concern regarding BW came from non-states actors 
or rebel fighters acquiring these capabilities and using them on the state itself.81  Moving 
states to take precautions to safeguard against terrorists, rebel opposition, and even other 
states trying to steal or learn more about biological weapons programs.  These 
precautions where in the form of hiding and denying a program’s existence, developing a 
robust defensive program to offset its offensive BW program, or abandoning the program 
79 Spiers, Edward M. "Chapter 2: Deterrence and Disarmament: Responses to Chemical and Biological 
Warfare, 1919-93." In History of Chemical & Biological Weapons, 47-68. n.p.: Reaktion Books Ltd., 2010. 
Military & Government Collection. p.50 
80 Ibid. 26, p.34 
81 Ibid 26, p.49 
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altogether to support international efforts to promote non-proliferation of BW.  These 
multilateral efforts to curb biological weapons development and use can be key indicators 
as to why we have not seen a large scale biological weapons attack since WWII.  
However, it does not account for states that did continue developing the capabilities and 
states that developed deadlier and more virulent agents under a “dual-use” designation.  
Additionally, it does not address the non-state actors’ role in using biological weapons in 
smaller scale attacks. 
One could make the argument that historical non-proliferation efforts and 
international conventions to safeguard against biological weapons development are 
responsible for a low BW incidence rates post-WWII.  Yet, this argument focuses on 
international, multilateral non-proliferation cooperation efforts and states’ capabilities; it 
does not explain why BWs are still considered a threat and a viable option for terrorist 
groups in the post-WWII era considering international safeguards.  Further, it does not 
explain why small attacks using a BW have not had the effect that other WMD have had 
on society.  For this reason, these efforts are not included in this analysis to explain the 
relationship between biological weapons and terrorism post-WWII.  
Not all biological agents are equal. 
Concerns about BW are rooted in historical events where human populations have 
been vulnerable or decimated by infectious diseases. Therefore, the fear comes from 
technological advancements to, intentionally or unintentionally create new viruses and 
bacteria or weaponize existing bioagents. However, this fear coupled with the fear of a 
surprise attack by a terrorist group illuminates our imaginations with endless possibilities 
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for mass chaos.  Yet, in order to disaggregate the biological weapon threat from the 
terrorist threat, it is useful to briefly examine bioagents’ designation.  
Biological weapons use pathogenic organisms to inflict death or harm in humans, 
animals, and plants.  Most biological agents used as a weapon are living organisms that 
can reproduce and multiply; this quality allows biological agents to have a large impact 
using little effort and a small number of organisms.  Some biological agents used as a 
weapon can also spread from one organism to another, making the host organism a 
delivery instrument to propagate infection.  Biological agents used in a military conflict 
or terrorist attack have the potential to create an epidemic, especially if local sanitation 
conditions are poor, public health infrastructure is weak, and there are large rural 
populations.  In turn they can cause great impact to the entire population, potentially 
extending across borders.82   
Although the number of biological agents that could pose the greatest threat to 
public health is small, the biological agents included in that number, could potentially 
cause the largest threat to national security and public safety. Public health officials 
define threat by measuring the ability to limit the numbers of casualties and control the 
incident and prevalence of a disease.83  Those agents that are difficult to control are 
considered more of a threat. Highly contagious diseases and airborne illnesses can have a 
larger impact than slower, curable bacteria.   
W. Seth Carus’ does a comprehensive analysis of traditional biological warfare, 
biocrimes, and bioterrorism and includes the bioagents used, acquired, attempted to 
acquire, involved in a threat of use, or expressed interest in using in his working paper, 
82 Morales Pedraza, Jorge. "The Need to Establish the Organisation for the Prohibition of Biological 
Weapons: A Proposal for the Future." Public Organization Review 12, no. 1 (March 2012): 57-70. p.58 
83 Ibid. 5, p523 
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Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological Agents in the 20th Century.  In 
Figure 1, Carus categorizes the bioagents in two columns.  For the purposes of this paper, 
I have distinguished between virus and bacteria because these have varying degrees of 
impact when disseminated.   I also highlight the overlap in agents used in biowarfare and 
biocrimes and terrorism.  The overlap in war and terrorism may indicate the most 
dangerous and most successful biological agent for causing death.  For example, referring 





 Traditional biological 
warfare agents 
Agents associated with 
biocrimes and bioterrorism 
Bioagents Bacillus anthracis (b 
anthrax)◊ 
Brucella suis◊ 
Coxiella burnetii (Q fever)◊  
Francisella tularensis 
(tularemia or rabbit fever)◊ 
Smallpox• 
Viral encephalitis• 













Yellow fever virus• 
Yersinia pestis*◊ 
* Duplicates, ◊ Bacteria, • Virus 
Figure 1 
Source: Carus, 2001 
 
According to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), biological 
agents are not only pathogens, but include biotoxins.  The Centers for Disease Control 
84 I use ‘lethal’ in terms of the estimates reflected from a scenario when a 50-kg agent is released by 
aircraft along a 2-km line upwind of a population centre of 500,000. Salmonella was not included in this 
research. The research and table was conducted by Christopher, et al., JAMA 278; 1997: 412. 
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and Prevention define biotoxins as poisons that are derived or produced by plants, insects 
and animals. They are not living organisms that multiply and spread. However, many 
biotoxins are extremely deadly they are not often regarded as biological agents, but are 
often called biological weapons based on their biological origin.85  Keeping in line with 
the BTWC, I will not exclude cases involving the use of biotoxins in terror attacks. 
In order to answer the question as to why the United States has not experienced a 
large-scale biological weapons attack during the post-WWII era and to test the hypothesis 
that biological weapons do not suit the needs of terrorists, I will first merge terrorist 
groups’ method of operation with their organizational structure to create a profile of the 
most likely group to use a biological weapon.  Second, I will examine how technology 
factors into their weapons choices based on the previously established profile and the 
groups’ past attacks.86  Finally, I will examine biological weapons’ capabilities with the 
groups’ intent and motive. 
Method of Operation 
To the majority of people that have experienced or witnessed terrorism’s violent 
means it is hard to imagine that there is a method of operation. These methods, as foreign 
or unconventional as they may seem, are intended and planned.  Further, they have a 
rational purpose to the groups that conduct them; they are not random and are rarely 
without a larger purpose.  This purpose depends widely on the group and their method of 
operation. This method may depend on size, origin, objective, etc.  However, Gerstein 
85 Arnon SS, Schechter R, Inglesby TV, et al. Botulinum Toxin as a Biological Weapon: Medical and Public 
Health Management. JAMA. 2001;285(8):1059-1070.  
86 Jackson and Frelinger explore technology’s influence on terrorists’ weapons choices and targets. 
Jackson, Brian A., and David A. Frelinger. "Rifling Through the Terrorists' Arsenal: Exploring Groups' 




                                                          
provides three concise methods of operation to work with such as, traditional, waning, or 
apocalyptic.87  
Traditional Method 
The traditional method is one where the terrorist organization is politically 
influenced and uses tactics ranging from political activism to violent protest. Traditional 
methods of operation also suggests that support from the base is important and therefore, 
requires a longer life-cycle, which means they are also concerned about blowback or 
retaliation in response to violent campaigns. 
A traditional method of operation is not likely to use a biological weapon based 
on the sensitivity to its base.  The retaliation against the group will put supporters at risk 
shortening the organizations life-cycle.  Additionally, the possibility of blowback and 
causing an epidemic among supporters can hurt the cause and weaken the political 
objective, countering any possible gains.  Yet, biological weapons provide deniability and 
a possible way to evade any responsibility.  Traditional methods can also violent, but are 
more strategic in their targeting in advancing their cause.  Therefore, biological weapons 
could suit the needs of a traditional method of operation if it advances the cause in some 
way without the possible loss of support or extreme retaliation.  A possible use could be 
smaller scale and more targeted, i.e. the 2001 anthrax letter attacks or more recently the 
2013 ricin letters. 
Waning Method 
Waning terrorist operations start out as being mainly violent and eventually 
abandon violent means and focus on political gains.  In similar fashion to the traditional 
method, they also seek the approval of their constituents and avoid high-profile, high-
87 Ibid. 17, loc.602 
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violent methods.  In this context biological weapons may loose their appeal because of 
human geography and the possibility of infecting themselves as well as their base.  
The waning method of operation is probably the least likely to use biological 
weapons as a means to further its cause and meet its objective.  Even in the earlier and 
more violent tactics, waning methods are more concerned with gaining favor and support.  
Due to biological weapons indiscriminate propagation, harming innocent women and 
children may not bode well with supporters.  Additionally, waning methods are not solely 
concentrated on violent means to meet its objectives and groups tend to seek legitimate 
political means to support their cause.  Also, the resources and expertise required to 
develop or acquire a biological weapon would be better used on more politically 
acceptable means on one side or cheaper conventional weapons on the other. 
Apocalyptic Method 
The apocalyptic method of operations is less interested or concerned with support 
from a base and is more violent, yielding more casualties as part of their goals or 
intentions.  The term apocalyptic suggests that this method is not concerned with 
retaliation from the adversary, even with the possible destruction of their group and death 
of their supporters.  However, groups acting under this method are dissuaded by the 
desire to maintain their cause and more motivated to use WMD to achieve its goal.  
Apocalyptic groups do not last long because they cannot survive without support or 
compete against government retaliation.  They also have limited resources to carry out 
missions.    
Therefore, apocalyptic methods of operation are the most likely to use biological 
weapons for two reasons; first, biological weapons can incite psychological fear in 
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society that last longer than any conventional explosion can, bring more notoriety and 
validity to their objective.  Second, these methods do not consider constituents therefore, 
there is little thought given about whom it will effect or what supporters will disagree 
with the attack.  Further, groups that utilize the apocalyptic method of operation might 
bypass the technological challenges of weaponizing a bioagent and use group members as 
hosts to spread a contagious disease, in an act of suicide, all for the cause.  This type of 
tactic reduces the need for resources and is easily homegrown.  
Organizational Structure 
Organizational structure can influence the method of operation a group adopts, 
specifically based on its leadership. This influence will specifically inform the violence 
this group intends on pursuing and to what degree. There are three structures an 
organization can organize itself into; hierarchical, decentralized, leaderless resistance and 
multiple leaders model.  Although, leaderless resistance and multiple leaders model are 
advanced forms of decentralized organization, I will still retain this as a separate category 
to include lone wolf and homegrown terrorist groups that have fewer members and are 
not formally tied to a larger group.88 
Hierarchical 
The hierarchical organizational structure depends on a single leader with one or 
more subordinates handling various functions.  Decisions are made at the top and orders 
trickle down to the bottom of the organization.  This structure works well in a 
geographical area where it is easy to communicate with subordinates.  Organizations that 
have utilized this structure have historically operated regionally.  Hierarchical 
organizations are easier to retaliate against, since the leader is in a central or single 
88 Ibid. 20, p.579 
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location.   
Decentralized 
A decentralized organizational structure suggests that decisions on operations are 
not made at the apex of the leadership structure, always.  Members in a decentralized 
organization plan and carry out operations guided by the larger organization objective.  A 
decentralized organization does not rely on close geographical proximity to members in 
order to carry out objectives.  However, communication between networks poses an issue 
for financial and technical supports.  Decentralized organizations are less likely to invest 
time and resources in complex attacks requiring a lot of expertise.   
Leaderless Resistance and Multiple Leaders 
 Leaderless resistance and multiple leaders models of organizational structure are 
similar to decentralized models, where members act autonomously, but are bound by an 
objective or ideology.  This category accounts for lone-wolf actors.  Groups that fit into 
this category do not have communications or support issues because they are in a lot of 
way autonomous from any larger organization.89 
 In the following table (Figure 2) illustrating the likelihood and possible outcomes 
of various groups’ ability to carry out a biological weapons attack and its possible 
outcome, I show that the most likely group to use a biological weapon are those with a; 
hierarchical organizational structure and apocalyptic method of operation; and a 
leaderless and multiple leaders organizational structure and apocalyptic method of 
operation.  This table does not factor in technological barriers and is strictly based on the 
two variables. 
89 These overarching categories are based on the way most social networks organize outlined by Hepner 
and Medina (2011) from data collected by Hepner and Medina (2008).   
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Technology’s Influence and Weapons Choice 
 In order to incorporate the technologies’ impact on groups’ decision to use 
biological weapons and to what degree, it is important to recognize that biological 
weapons can be highly sophisticated and deadly or unsophisticated with low impact, with 
varying degrees in between.  To classify BW further, I consider low-tech BW, as using a 
bioagent to contaminate food, water, air with no complex mechanism to disseminate the 
agent.  Conversely, a high-tech BW is using a highly virulent pathogen in a complex 
57 
 
delivery mechanism, much like aerosols.90  I will also include James Forest’s paradigm 
for explaining terrorists’ weapons choice. Which suggests the more technologically 
complex a weapon is, the more a terrorist will expect from it, measured by probability of 
success; therefore, establishing a dependent correlation between weapon choice and 
impact. 91  Terrorists’ weapons choices are also based largely on targets and generally 
assess the best weapon to achieve maximum impact.  In order to isolate cases where a 
weapon was chosen based on a target, I will use Jackson and Frelinger’s typology of 
terrorist incidences by classes of operation; 1) attack on a specific individual; 2) attack on 
individuals in general; 3) attack on vehicles; 4) attack on a structure; 5) attack on an 
area.92  Since there are very few cases that involve biological weapons, I focus on 
answering the question as to why that is the case? 
Case Studies 
 Biological weapons are considered a weapon of mass destruction and one of the 
biggest transnational threats in our day.  Yet, very few terrorism cases point to the 
validity of this argument.  In order to understand this contradiction of reality, I seek to 
examine random cases of domestic terrorism by non-state actors and use the previously 
outlined methodology to test my hypothesis stating, bioagents are complex organisms 
that require advanced understanding of biotechnology and engineering to effectively 
weaponize them into a WMD and this understanding is currently beyond the 
advancements of terrorist groups.  Further, terrorists are conservative in their weapons 
90 Repez, Filofteia. "BIOTERRORISM -- PRESENT THREAT FOR SECURITY." Bulletin Of The 'Carol I' National 
Defence University / Buletinul Universitatii Nationale De Aparare 'Carol I' no. 1 (January 2012): 13-20. 
International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center. 
91 Forest, James J. F. "Framework for Analyzing the Future Threat of WMD Terrorism." Journal Of Strategic 
Security 5, no. 4 (Winter2012 2012): 51-68. International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center, 
p.55 
92 Ibid. 26, p.587 
58 
 
                                                          
choice and are in some cases sensitive to blowback, either from their support base or 
government retaliation.  Therefore, our general security estimate of bioterrorism does not 
suit the weapon or the terrorist.   
 Consider the four domestic cases of terrorism by non-state actors; the most recent, 
Boston Marathon Bombings; the Christmas Day Underwear Bomber; the 9/11 Attacks; 
and the Rajneeshee Cult in Oregon.  These four cases provide a wide range of 
information to examine and test against my hypothesis.   
Boston Marathon 
 On April 15, 2013, two men planted homemade explosive devises in a crowd 
gathered to watch the Boston Marathon.  The explosive devises consisted of pressure 
cookers; an explosive powder that is usually fairly easy to make or acquire; shrapnel in 
the form of nails, bee bees and glass; and an igniter, which is still unknown.93  This 
method of attack, a public explosion with a homemade devise from materials easily 
attainable from the Internet or local hardware stores is low cost, low tech and has been 
proven to have high impact.   
 The men involved were two, young Muslim-Chechen immigrants acting on their 
own accord, but inspired by radical Islamic lectures on the Internet by Anwar al-Awlaki, 
a radical Islamic Jihadist working with al-Qaeda’s network in Yemen.  The younger of 
the two men, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev told FBI interrogators that the attacks were in protest of 
the U.S. violence against Muslims in Iraq and Afghanistan.94 
93  McDonald, Brent. "Bomb Details Emerge in Boston Case - NYTimes.com." The New York Times - 
Breaking News, World News & Multimedia. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/17/us/officials-
investigate-boston-explosions.html?pagewanted=all (accessed May 1, 2013). 
94 Schmitt, Eric, Mark Mazzetti, Michael Schmidt, and Scott Shane. "Boston Plotters Said to Initially Target 
July 4 for Attack." New York Times. N.p., 2 May 2013. Web. 2 May 2013. 
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 The two men worked together under a leaderless organizational structure and 
apocalyptic method of operation.  Their methods were apocalyptic because they were 
using high-impact violence to fulfill their cause without consideration for support from a 
base or retaliation from the government.  Additionally, they did not have a sustainable 
plan supporting their attack.  In other words, detonating a devise in a crowd of civilians 
and killing three individuals indiscriminately will not change their perceived relationship 
between the U.S. and Muslims. 
 According to my methodology, the actors in this case are most likely to use 
biological weapons with low impact, based on organizational structure and method of 
operation.  Yet, they did not.  For one, these men did not have the expertise or resources 
to cultivate or buy bioagents.  Second, they used a method that would yield a large impact 
with the limited resources they had.  Third, the men planned their attack based on the 
opportunity to kill a large amount of people outside, meaning they also chose their 
weapon based on ‘an attack on an area’ and this is an objective biological weapons 
cannot meet on the low-tech end.95  My methodology suggests that they would only 
achieve limited impact if they were to use a biological agent because of the lack of 
resources and expertise leaderless/apocalyptic groups have.  As Forest expressed, there is 
a dependent correlation between impact success and technical complexity.  These 
technological restraints and desire informed how these men would carryout their attack.96  




96 Ibid. 39 
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would have wanted to invest the time and resources to achieve its maximum lethal 
impact. 
The Christmas Day Underwear Bomber 
 On Christmas Day of 2008, 23 year-old Nigerian, Umar Farouk Abdulamutallab 
attempted to blow up a commercial airliner by detonating explosives in his pants.  The 
explosive Abdulamutallab attempted to use was made up of PETN and TATP, highly 
explosive materials, along with other materials.  Abdulamutallab used a three-ounce full 
syringe with an unidentified substance to inject into his pants in order to create a 
chemical chain reaction that would ignite the PETN and TATP.97  Had this explosion 
been successful it would have blown a hole in the airplane, probably causing it to crash. 
 Abdulamutallab was in communication with Anwar al-Alwaki in Yemen and 
supported by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).  He purchased a $2,800 plane 
ticket with cash and was flying with the bomb from Nigeria via Amsterdam to Chicago, 
where he had planned to detonate the explosive.  After his failed attempt, AQAP praised 
Abdulamutallab as a hero and claimed the mujahedeen overcame many technical barriers 
to create the bomb and they were happy it made it past security.98   
 This case is similar to Boston, where the method of operation is apocalyptic 
because of the suicide element to the attack.  However, the organizational structure would 
be considered, decentralized.  AQAP is part of the larger al-Qaeda network and 
97 CHANG, KENNETH. "PETN, Explosive Found on Flight 253, Is Among Most Powerful - NYTimes.com." The 
New York Times - Breaking News, World News & Multimedia. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/28/us/28explosives.html?_r=0 (accessed April 5, 2013). 
98 Hosenball, Mark, Michael Isikoff, and Evan Thomas. "The Radicalization of Umar Farouk 
Abdulmutallab." Newsweek 155, no. 2 (January 11, 2010): 37-41. OmniFile Full Text Mega (H.W. Wilson), 
EBSCOhost (accessed March 6, 2013). 
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Abdulamutallab was acting under their direction, with their weapon.99  According to my 
methodology outlined in figure 2, they would be likely to use a BW with significant 
impact.  They would be ‘likely’ to use because they can share resources among various 
groups in the network and they can support with technical expertise and money.  This 
event also shows that they are willing to develop alternative ways to inflict violence on 
society.  However, their investment for new technology is now a waste once the 
intelligence community learns their method and counters it by introducing new scanners 
at airports and regulating liquids on planes.  
 The technological complexity deterrent does not suit this case because the use of 
chemical explosives is technologically complex.  However, one explanation for not using 
biological weapons in this case is explained by, an attack on a vehicle, the previously 
mentioned classification of operation by Jackson and Frelinger’s.100  Here the primary 
target was not the people it was the aircraft.  Even a high-impact bioweapon would not 
make the statement that an exploding plane would.  Therefore, Forest’s correlation may 
still apply here, where AQAP wanted a high-impact success for the resources they 
invested.  In addition, it tested the technology and proved it could make it past security.  
This could contribute to the payoff for innovation. 
9/11 World Trade Center Attack 
On September 11, 2001, 19 members of al-Qaeda under the direction of Osama 
bin Laden hijacked four commercial airline jets.  Two jets inevitably crashed into the two 
World Trade Center Towers, one into the Pentagon and another, meant for the White 
House, ended up crashing in rural Pennsylvania.  The 19 men used knives, box cutters 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid. 35 
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and mace to overtake the crew and passengers on board.101  This attack was low-tech and 
high impact.  It took less than two years and cost al-Qaeda roughly half a million dollars 
to implement.102   
 In this case al-Qaeda was acting under a hierarchical structure and with 
traditional/apocalyptic methods.  Their motivations were more in line with traditional 
methods as it pertained to their supporter base and how this attack would rally their base 
and show their validity.  Yet, it was apocalyptic in its execution and outcome.  Retaliation 
by their adversaries has severely crippled their reputation as well as killed many leaders, 
as well as Osama bin-Laden.  In my methodology, I categorize al-Qaeda as hierarchical 
and apocalyptic.  Therefore, they would use a biological weapon with high impact.  
Granted this is based on al-Qaeda’s capabilities during 2000.  At that time al-Qaeda had 
money and could have acquired a biological weapon from a stockpile in Iran, Iraq or 
Syria that could have inflicted illness on all of New York causing an immediate 
pandemic.  However, there are no guarantees with biological weapons and at the price al-
Qaeda invested in 9/11 they wanted a guaranteed impact and success.103  Additionally, 
biological weapons would not have worked based on al-Qaeda’s targets, structures.  Once 
again, biological weapons are too technically complex to sufficiently deliver the desired 
impact of the group regardless of method of operation and organization structure. 
 
 
101 9/11 Commission Report. http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf 
102 Carter, S & Cox, A. 9/11: The Reconing, One 9/11 Tally: $3.3 Trillion. The New York Times, Sept. 8, 
2012. http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/09/08/us/sept-11-reckoning/cost-graphic.html?_r=0 
(accessed April 12, 2013). 
103 Ouagrham-Gormley, Sonia Ben. "Barriers to Bioweapons." International Security 36, no. 4 (Spring2012 
2012): 80-114. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed February 17, 2013). p.89 
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The Rajneeshee   
 In 1984, an Indian based cult out of Oregon contaminated local restaurants salad 
bar with salmonella typhimurium purchased from a medical supply company.104  The 
motive for this act was to influence local elections in favor of the Rajneeshee, who 
wanted to expand their compound.  Their goal was to make people sick so they could not 
vote in the following day’s election.  Nearly 750 local citizens became ill due to the 
contaminated salad bar, fortunately the Rajneeshee still did not have the number they 
needed to win the election. 
 The Rajneeshee are not considered a terrorist organization, they are more a 
religious cult.  Therefore, applying a method of operation is difficult because they did not 
operate under violent means, but if to isolate this one incident, they would be categorized 
as a hierarchical/traditional group.  They fall under hierarchical because they follow their 
leader, Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh and traditional because they care about alienating their 
supporters.  In my methodology, their category would be the least likely to use a BW 
with low impact.  This is accurate given the situation of the Rajneeshee, they used a 
biological agent as a weapon with low impact.  They could have used a stronger more 
viral agent to make the town sick, but that would not serve their purpose and it would 
also create blowback from supporters and the local government.  The biological weapon 
provided cover and deniability.  In addition, it was acceptable for their target as an attack 
on individuals and provided enough impact for the technical complexity they were 
willing to put forth. 
 
104 Guillemin, Jeanne, Biological Weapons: From the Invention of State-Sponsored Programs to 
Contemporary Bioterrorism. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005. p.158 
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Conclusions from the Case Studies 
 Falkenrath and Newman set out five reasons why non-state actors are not 
interested in using biological weapons: 1) mass casualties do not serve non-state actors 
objectives; 2) does not increase coercive power; 3) increased violence and decreases 
support for cause; 4) additional risks and challenges in acquiring deadly agents; 5) risk 
receiving stronger countermeasures.  In each case these factors played a role in weapons 
choice.  The examined groups or individuals do not view casualties as an end, rather 
means to achieve their ends, which is usually furthering their cause.  Coercive power 
requires display that gets a lot of attention and has an immediate impact, biological 
weapons can’t provide.  With al-Qaeda, increased violence may have the opposite effect 
that Newman and Falkenrath claim it will.  However, the Rajneeshee Cult lost members 
and sympathizers when the public found out what their leaders did.  Risks and challenges 
are key in biological weapons use.  For one reason or another, biological weapons are 
hard to acquire and modify.  Stronger countermeasures are difficult to quantify or qualify 
in these cases and in many ways the only strategic reason to use a biological weapon is 
the deniability of using it and avoid direct countermeasures.  The Rajneeshee cult was 
able to evade any responsibility for their attack until a former member told authorities 
what had happened. 
In the previously examined cases organizational structure, method of operation, 
target, resources and desired impact all contribute to the weapons decision.  In the Boston 
Marathon Attack, the men were lone-wolf actors with limited resources and no long-term 
objective.  Biological weapons would not work for the attackers because biological 
weapons are technically complex, and would not solicit the impact they desired.  Similar 
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reasoning works for 9/11 and the Underwear Bomber, biological weapons could not blow 
up a plane or destroy a structure.  In these cases the visual impact or cause mattered more 
than inflicting mass casualty, death was a  
byproduct and not a goal.  Both cases, displayed a level of technical complexity and this 
requires an expectation for guaranteed impact and success, a guarantee that biological 
weapons cannot provide.  In the one case where a biological agent was used as a weapon, 
the Rajneeshee cult provides a clear case for many contradictions in the literature 
concerning biological weapons.  For example, their biological weapons use was 
controlled and strategically targeted, without mass casualty, and provided deniability to 
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Plugging these actors into the previous table it is apparent there are many factors 
involved in a violent non-state actors’ (VNSA) weapon choice and that organizational 
structure and method of operation tell us little about whether or not a group will and can 
pursue a biological weapons.  The VNSA that did use a biological weapon is, according 
to the table the least likely to use a biological weapon.  Unfortunately, there are not many 
cases of biological weapons use by a VNSA to plug into the table, further analysis on 
who will use a biological weapon is necessary.  However, the table does provide a 
structure for the possible use of biological weapons by various VNSAs. 
Conclusion 
The concluding factors as to why the United States has not experienced a large 
scale, biological weapons attack by a non-state actor in the post WWII era are simply; 
biological agents are complex organisms that require advanced understanding of 
biotechnology and engineering to effectively weaponize them into a weapon of mass 
destruction and this understanding is currently beyond the advancements of modern 
biotechnology and modern terrorist groups and VNSA.  Terrorists are technologically 
challenged and weigh weapons complexity against impact, expecting guaranteed high 
impact results for increasingly technical complex weapons.  Furthermore, terrorist 
organizational structure and methods of operation determine the capability and motives 
for investing time and resources into technologically complex weapons and very few 
groups that have the capabilities and resources are not motivated enough to use biological 
weapons.  Conversely, those groups that have the motivation to use biological weapons 
do not have the means.  Therefore, the union between terrorism and biological weapons is 
an unhappy and dysfunctional relationship.  The current assumptions on bioterrorism as 
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we understand it does not suit the group or the weapon and this is the main reason why 
the United States has not experienced a large scale, biological weapons attack by a 
violent non-state actor in the post WWII era. 
 There are many variables that could be included in this study to answer this 
question, and the study of this topic could be more comprehensive in referencing various 
efforts to mitigate the possibilities of violent non-states actors’ abilities to acquire or use 
biological weapons.  Additionally, an analysis on quantitative data comparing costs and 
impacts of conventional weapons to biological weapons would enrich the claims in this 
study.  Yet, as this study adequately shows, the United States is safe from a large-scale 
bioterrorism attack until highly motivated, organized terrorists expect less impact for 

















Immunity: The Real Bioweapon 
 
Introduction 
In 2005, the National Security Council introduced the National Strategy for 
Pandemic Influenza; it noted that nearly 36,000 deaths and over 200,000 hospitalizations 
occur every year in the United States due to seasonal flu.105 Given the impacts of the 
seasonal flu on the United States’ already adequate health system, one can only image the 
devastating effect a highly virulent infectious disease would have on a densely populated 
city in the U.S. or one of these seasonal flu viruses on a less adequate health system in a 
developing country. Reportedly, the last three pandemics in, 1918, 1957 and 1968 caused 
approximately 100 million deaths, more deaths than World War I and World War II 
combined.106 Based on these figures a pandemic with the deadly magnitude of the past 
would have disastrous impacts on the global economy, military readiness, civilian 
workforce, and stress the medical response and health systems.   
Throughout history the introduction of disease and lack of immunity has shaped 
the geopolitical world and determined the strength of nations.  Immunity has changed 
societies and sometimes provided unintentional strategic positioning.  For many societies 
building immunity and fighting infectious diseases were as valuable as gaining territory 
or advancing technologically in defense and weaponry. For example, the Spanish’s 
successful conquest over the Aztecs and Incas can be attributed to the Spanish 
105 Humphries, Mark Osborne. "Paths of Infection: The First World War and the Origins of the 1918 
Influenza Pandemic." War In History 21, no. 1 (January 2014): 55-81. 
106 Kim, Joseph. "Are We Prepared For The Next Pandemic Flu Virus?." Vital Speeches Of The Day 79, no. 
12 (December 2013): 407 
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conquistadors’ immunity to smallpox and measles.  These illnesses had a major physical 
and psychological effect on the indigenous populations in the Americas, as they watched 
their people suffer and die while the Spanish remained unharmed.  This led to eventual 
Spanish dominance on the continent.107  The unintentional consequence of the Spanish 
conquistadors’ immunity led to the subjugation and downfall of the ancient Inca and 
Aztec civilizations in less than three years.108  However, had the Spanish not dealt with 
these diseases previously in Spain then history would have told a different story. 
Therefore, can immunity to virulent, communicable diseases be used as a weapon of 
mass casualty and disruption? 
Drawing on the experiences of historical pandemics and colonial epidemics and 
noting the role disease and immunity has played in the intentional or unintentional 
strategic advantage of one society over another, the proceeding study will examine how 
efforts to develop immunity to diseases advances national or international security or 
insecurity and to what degree, if any. It will answer whether or not immunity to virulent, 
communicable diseases can be used as a weapon of mass casualty and disruption?  
However, before examining disease and immunity on past and present society and their 
potential ability to cause mass casualty, it is important to point out that there are known 
bioagents assumed to be “critical agents”109 in bioterrorism and biowarfare that do have 
107 Oldstone, Michael B. A. Viruses, Plagues, and History. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. p30 
108 Ibid. p34 
109 “Critical agents” are defined by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in three categories A,B 
and C. Category A agent are classified as posing the highest risk to national security and can be easily 
disseminated or transmitted, result in high mortality rates, cause mass disruption, require special 
preparedness actions and precautions. Category B agents are those that have second highest priority and 
are moderately easy to disseminate, moderate mortality rates, require enhanced disease surveillance. 
Category C agents are emerging pathogens that can be engineered for mass production and dissemination 
due to availability and have the potential to create a public health impact. “Emergency Preparedness and 
Response: Bioterrorism Agents/Diseases” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/agentlist-category.asp  (Date accessed: January 2013). 
70 
 
                                                          
the aforementioned impact on society. Yet, less is assumed of non-critical agents such as, 
HIV/AIDS, methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), influenza viruses, 
synthetic biology, and severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). Therefore, in this 
examination the conventional bioweapon “critical agents” will not be included. However, 
an examination of immunity to some of these other critical agents will be. 
Literature Review 
In order to properly examine the question as to whether or not efforts to develop 
immunity to diseases advances national or international security and to what degree can 
immunity become a weapon of mass casualty and destruction?  The public implications 
of a healthy population have to be linked to the security of a nation.  Additionally, health 
needs to be recognized as an implicit component of a national security or otherwise there 
is no reason to discuss public safety, disease surveillance, and any national system geared 
toward contributing to the well-being of the populace.  It is not an oversight that States 
that contribute to economic development in developing countries rely heavily on 
providing assistance for health infrastructure, HIV/AIDS education and prevention, and 
sanitation related projects.110   As Dr. Harley Feldbaum suggests health assistance is an 
important “soft power” tool in foreign policy and has a direct link to protecting national 
security interests.  He highlights that international influenza surveillance was non-
existent leading up to 2003 when H5N1, avian flu presented itself as a potential threat to 
national security as a pandemic and then between 2004-2008, $2 billion was allocated to 
combat the disease.111  Considering health as a ‘soft power’ creates confusion around the 
notion or concept of ‘health security’ and for the purposes of this examination, ‘health 
110 Feldbaum, H., Lee, K., Michaud, J. ”Global Health and Foreign Policy.” (2010) Epidemiologic Reviews, 
32 (1), pp. 83 
111 Ibid. pp. 85 
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security’ is concerned with the protection of populations from public health threats and 
how these threats influence foreign policy or state insecurity.112  Similarly, many 
developing nations have speculated that ‘health security’ is code for securing the west 
and those efforts to survey disease have drastically decreased efforts to provide 
preventative and primary care in developing countries.113  However, Feldbaum and Lee 
identify three key themes in health security relevant to national security concerns: First, 
infectious disease poses a great threat to individuals, populations or states in a highly 
interconnected world; Second, pathogens may be used by terrorists or weaponized by 
state-sponsored defensive biological programs; Third, a severe disease burden can impact 
and threaten the stability of states and regions socially, politically, economically and 
militarily.  HIV/AIDS is often an example of the impact of a disease burden in poorer 
developing countries.114  
Lee Jong-wook, former Director-General of the World Health Organization 
claimed pandemics do not know international borders.115  After the emerging H1N1 
epidemic in 2005, influenza started to get more international attention with the World 
Health Assembly (WHA) revising and adopting a new WHA Resolution 58.3.116  The 
revised Second Article of the International Health Regulations state that the scope and 
purpose of the regulations are "to prevent, protect against, control and provide a public 
112 In his analysis of health security Aldis deconstructs the confusion around health security and provides 
clear and distinct categories where ‘health security’ is shared between varying interests. Aldis, William. 
"Health security as a public health concept: a critical analysis." Revista Gerencia Y Políticas De Salud 8, no. 
17 (December 2009): 12-27. p.5 
113 Rushton, Simon. "Global Health Security: Security for Whom? Security from What?" Political Studies 
59, no. 4 (December 2011): 781. 
114 Ibid, p.783 
115 World Health Organization, "World Health Assembly adopts new International Health Regulations: 
New rules govern national and international response to disease outbreaks" (2005). 
116 World Health Organization, Revision of the International Health Regulations, WHA58.3, Fifty-eighth 
World Health Assembly (2005). 
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health response to the international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with 
and restricted to public health risks."  This concept of security through public health was 
further emphasized in 2006 as the United States Congress passed the Pandemic and All-
Hazards Preparedness Act (PAHPA) which created the Office of the Assistant Secretary 
for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) within the Department of Health and Human 
Services.  The ASPR is responsible for developing the National Health Security Strategy 
(NHSS) for the United States, which outlines the nation’s response to large, potentially 
harmful public health incidents, including incidents caused by bioterror and natural 
disasters.117  Yet, one of the largest programs managed by the ASPR is the BioShield 
Project, an act passed by congress calling for the development and purchase of medical 
countermeasures in the event of a bioterrorist attack.  The project expanded the stockpile 
of the smallpox vaccine to cover vaccinations for every person in the U.S., including half 
a million soldiers.118 
  In addition to providing funding to develop medical countermeasures (MCM), the 
United States Department of Health and Human Services also developed a strategy to 
enhance innovation, science and capacity, in addition to continuing to counter identified 
threats with the Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise 
(PHEMCE) strategy.119  A former U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 
Kathleen Sebelius speaking on why she wanted a review of the MCM enterprise in the 
U.S. said, “the ultimate goal of this review is a modernized countermeasure production 
process where we have more promising discoveries, more advanced development, more 
117 HHS ASPR. 2009. National Health Security Strategy 
118 Project BioShield Annual Report to Congress 
https://www.medicalcountermeasures.gov/media/33065/pbs_report_2012_hires_final2_508.pdf  




                                                          
robust manufacturing, better stockpiling, and more advanced distribution practices… we 
want to create a system that can respond to any threat at any time.”120 The efforts of the 
United States to address the seriousness of being unprepared for a medical emergency 
due to infectious diseases are in line with the defensive practice of vaccinating the 
military and pushing our civilian society to have preemptive immunity. 
Andrew Artenstein provides a comprehensive study on the efforts to vaccinate the 
U.S. military in order to protect soldiers against some of the most deadly and virulent 
diseases.  He points out that disease prevention has been a large part of military readiness 
dating back to the Continental Army during the American Revolution.121 Artenstein also 
admits that there are a variety of infectious threats and diseases that face military forces, 
such as malaria that continues to pose a public health problem for many deployed in areas 
of the world were malaria is prevalent.  Yet, Artenstein encourages the use and further 
development of vaccinations that will boost immunity in the military.122  
Artenstein is not alone in this point of view.  Many believe that the development 
and implementation of vaccination programs are the most important medical contribution 
to global and public health.  Hassani, Patel, and Pirofski agree that vaccination-based 
strategies for increasing immunity are highly effective.  However, Hassani et al. provide 
counterpoints to the notion of relying solely on vaccination as the main defense against 
bioweapon attacks.  They provide four uncertainties around vaccination strategies to 
combat bioweapons and disease prevalence: First, the lack of a vaccine’s availability; 
Second, the uncertain safety and effectiveness of a vaccine; Third, the vaccine my not 
120 HHS ASPRhe Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise Review: 2010 
https://www.medicalcountermeasures.gov/media/1138/mcmreviewfinalcover-508.pdf  
121 Artenstein, Andrew W. Vaccines: A Biography. New York, NY: Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, 
2010. 
122 Ibid, p. 21 
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work on large proportions of the general population, i.e., immunocompromised 
individuals, children, and the elderly; Fourth, vaccines are subject to intellectual property 
and creation and development are often kept secret.123  
Dr. Amesh Adalja strongly discourages against relying on current vaccination 
strategy to combat infectious disease for several reasons and states that vaccinations are 
not a panacea.  He suggests that vaccinations and immunity to a disease often requires a 
series of inoculations in order to be the most effective; stating the need for continual 
booster shots for many infectious diseases such as, hepatitis B.  Adalja also points out 
that vaccination and inoculation is a personal or parental decision that creates 
vulnerabilities not only in the individuals that don’t choose to be inoculated, but also to 
populations too young to be vaccinated or immunocompromised individuals.  He warns 
that there are limits to vaccinations that could cause dangerous epidemics.124 
Another argument against running to antivirals and antibiotics is that they too can 
become ineffective against their counterparts.  Much like the process that creates 
immunity in human biology, this process of immunity is also replicated in many microbes 
from harmless intestinal bacteria to “superbugs.” It is known that bacteria evolve quickly 
and adapt to antibiotics used to threaten their existence. Therefore, the increased use of 
antibiotics will only increase the strength and drug-resistant qualities of dangerous 
germs.125 As Lee, Siddiqui, and Khan have observed, the advancements in new antibiotic 
drugs led to their overuse and the creation of drug resistant bacteria.  However, there are 
123 Hassani, M., Patel, M.C., Pirofski, L.-A. Vaccines for the prevention of diseases caused by potential 
bioweapons (2004) Clinical Immunology, 111 (1), pp. 11. 
124 Amesh A. Adalja. “Vaccines, Immunity, Wooping Cough, and Mumps.” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: 
Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science. (March 2011),  
125 McKay, B. “U.S. News: Losing Ground in War on Bugs --- Millions Each Year Develop Infections Resistant 
to Antibiotics, Report Finds. Wall Street Journal. (2013, Sep 17) 
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also increases in drug-resistant bacteria that have traditionally been treatable. Researchers 
in Italy identified strains of Mycobacterium tuberculosis (TB) that are resistant to well-
known TB treatments that have been spread by migrants coming from countries with high 
prevalence of TB. These cases require treatments that are more toxic and expensive to 
treat without a guarantee of effectiveness or safety.126  This gets even more complicated 
when infected individuals enter into populations where the disease has been eradicated 
and is rarely inoculated for the reemerging disease. 
Human migration and disease propagation has always posed a threat to countries.  
The United States understood this relationship early on and quarantine was an official 
practice used on many sick immigrants coming into the country.  In 1878, Congress 
passed the National Quarantine Act to prevent the introduction of infectious diseases into 
the United States.  This act was in response to a yellow fever outbreak that had thousands 
of immigrants looking for a safer place.  However, the act gave greater authority to 
Marine Hospital Service to quarantine ships that were carrying passengers with 
communicable diseases. The Quarantine Act along with the Immigration Act of 1891 
denied immigrants entry into the United States, who had dangerous and contagious 
diseases, keeping the American public safe from a possible pandemic.   
Recently, with the Ebola epidemic in Africa and its slow spread to other 
countries, the United States issued airport screenings with a potential for quarantine if an 
individual showed symptoms of the disease.  However, this recent Ebola outbreak has 
demonstrated the benefits of a secure and efficient public health system and has 
highlighted the health disparity between a developed nation and underdeveloped nation.  
126  F. MIGNONE, L. R. CODECASA, C. SCOLFARO, I. RAFFALDI, L. LANCELLA, M. FERRARESE, S. GARAZZINO, 
C. MARABOTTO, S. ESPOSITO, C. GABIANO, R. LIPRERI and P.-A. TOVO (2014). The spread of drug-resistant 
tuberculosis in children: an Italian case series. Epidemiology and Infection, 142, pp 2049-2056.  
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For example the only known experimental vaccine for Ebolavirus (EBOV) was 
developed and manufactured by a company in San Diego, California and was used on 
two American doctors, who recovered and are said to have built up antibodies that 
neutralizes the virus and are immune to EBOV.127  Given the 90 percent fatality rate for 
infected individuals in Africa without the experimental vaccine, it’s important to 
understand that the two American doctors could potentially become host reservoirs for 
EBOV and could potentially spread the virus, much like any infectious disease.  
Immunity is only beneficial to those that have immunity to a prevalent and present 
disease and that immunity comes with a market value for everyone else.  
Stewart Patrick explains that national security threats from weak and failing states 
have a spillover effect on the United States.128  These weak states have an impact on 
international order and much like terrorism, infectious diseases can cause widespread 
insecurity and international problems.  However, what can immunity do to strengthen 
vulnerabilities or how can immunity help a state’s adversaries gain strategic positioning 
on a disputed border or territory? 
Although SARS is a communicable disease that has real and immediate impacts 
on health, the economic impact on China’s foreign investment was just as damaging and 
provided a strategic advantage for other economic competitors.  The economic loss to 
China was estimated to be roughly $40 billion and could be higher if investors remained 
127 Gholipour, Bahar. “American Ebola Survivors Are likely Immune to Virus Strain Now.” Live Science. 
http://www.livescience.com/47511-are-ebola-survivors-immune.html  
128 Patrick, Stewart. 2006. "Weak States and Global Threats: Fact or Fiction?." Washington Quarterly 29, 
no. 2: p.28 
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uncertain about China’s abilities to manage other public health emergencies.129  U.S. 
fears about Chinese economic power were soon eased in light of China’s economic loss 
due to their inability to effectively manage an epidemic, which the United States 
managed seamlessly.  The United States contributed over 800 staff members from the 
Center for Disease Control to assist in the containment effort.130  
 Immunity to infectious diseases and the research to discover and counter 
emerging infectious disease has become a big business due to the national security 
implications of not fighting these diseases.  However, the question still remains as to 
whether immunity is in fact, a passive biological weapon and if the race to increase 
immunity is masked by a dual-use function?  Additionally, are efforts to develop and 
protect populations from diseases altruistic and humanitarian or are they a strategic in 
securing power and influence. Whereas immunity in the past was gained over time in a 
population, today immunity can go to the highest bidder.  This has been exemplified in 
the recent outbreak of the Ebola virus where the death rate is at 70 percent for those 
infected in West Africa, yet in the U.S. it is 11 percent.131   
Methodology 
 The method used to examine whether efforts to develop immunity to disease 
advance national and international security or insecurity and the degree immunity can 
become a weapon of mass destruction will consist of an analysis of historical epidemics 
129 Knobler, S. [et al.], editors. Learning from SARS : preparing for the next disease outbreak : workshop 
summary. Forum on Microbial Threats, Board on Global Health. (2004)  
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK92462/pdf/TOC.pdf  
130 Ibid. p.13 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK92462/pdf/TOC.pdf  
131 The number was calculated by the WHO by taking the number of Ebola cases divided by the number of 
people that have died due to the virus. I applied the same calculation to the one death in the U.S. verses 
its 9 survivors or recovered cases specifically, 2 contracted in the U.S., 4 diagnosed in the U.S. and 5 
evacuated to the U.S. from other countries. Epatko, L. “70 Percent Ebola Death Rate? Here’s How They 




                                                          
and their impact on a state, its population, and its geopolitical influence.  A literature 
review of medical countermeasures development and the arguments around vaccinations 
and immunity identified various themes and key questions in examining how efforts to 
develop immunity to diseases advance national and international security or insecurity? 
Additionally, by reviewing western expansion and European colonial history it also 
revealed questions on whether or not immunity to virulent, communicable diseases can 
be used as a weapon of mass casualty and disruption to further power and influence. 
These themes will assist in examining several case studies to assist in addressing these 
questions. Examining the Spanish exploration and evasion of Mesoamerica and the 
American annexation of the Kingdom of Hawai’i will provide rich context to 
understanding the role immunity and disease play in geopolitics and power.   
In addition, to examining these historical cases, this study will also examine the 
current state of affairs in immunity and disease prevalence around the world using the 
World Health Organization’s Global Health Estimates.132  These measures will provide a 
quantitative reference to gauging health security in a given state as it relates to vaccine 
rates for polio, HepB, and measles.  By taking the average of the three vaccine rates, it 
will provide the state with a vaccine coverage percentage that will give an indication of 
state immunity.  Comparing this data with the Fragile State Index provided by the Fund 
for Peace, which factors 12 categories for measuring the level of states stability will 
allow for a complete analysis of the role health plays in geopolitics and instability.133  
 
132 WHO. Global Health Estimates (GHE). Nov.2014. 
http://www.who.int/healthinfo/global_burden_disease/en/  




                                                          
Case Studies 
According to the World Health Organization’s (WHO) Global Health Estimates 
immunizations helps to prevent 2-3 million deaths a year from many common infectious 
diseases. Without immunization many of the weak and fragile states would suffer severe 
strains on their economy, public safety and social society.  In 2008, the WHO estimated 
8.8 million children, under the age of five years, dies from diseases preventable with a 
vaccination.134  The future development of countries depends on the ability to care for 
their populous and maintain a healthy level of immunity. In 2013, there were three polio-
endemic countries, opposed to 125 in 1998.135 These three endemic-countries; 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Somalia were also three of the top ten fragile states identified 
by the Fund for Peace. The Fragile State report compiles data on 12 categories that 
provide each state a score of progress or regression.  Given the information regarding the 
fragile nature of these countries coupled with a lack of immunity against communicable 
diseases it is likely that their geopolitical security is at risk.136  Drawing on lessons 
learned from historical pandemics and their impact on geopolitics and security, it is 
important that these countries provide higher rates of vaccinations or they could be in 
serious danger when a pandemic emerges to repeat history.  Violent non-state actors 
(VNSA) and region rivals may take advantage of these fragile states’ poor public health 
infrastructure and vulnerable population by releasing a bioweapon or introducing a 
disease that they are already immune to.  Figure 1 shows the vaccine rates for polio, 
measles, and Hepatitis B for the top ten most fragile states. Additionally, the United 
134 World Health Organization. Global Immunization Data. July 2014. 
http://www.who.int/immunization/monitoring_surveillance/global_immunization_data.pdf  
135 Ibid. pg3 




                                                          
States is added for a comparative look at the vaccination and immunization percentage.  
 
Figure 1. Coverage Percentages for the Top Ten Fragile States 
Country Measles HepB (infant) Polio Coverage 
South Sudan 55 NA 56 36% 
Somalia 29 34 24 29% 
Central African Rep. 29 28 28 28% 
Congo (D. R.) 80 87 85 84% 
Sudan 85 93 93 90% 
Chad 79 80 80 79% 
Afghanistan 82 90 90 87% 
Yemen 78 88 88 84% 
Haiti 80 85 92 86% 
Pakistan 61 66 66 64% 
United States 91 90 93 91% 
Source: table developed by author with data from FFP states index and WHO 
 
According to figure 1, South Sudan tops the chart for most fragile state as well as 
has the lowest immunization rate among these states.  Given the territorial dispute with 
The Sudan, South Sudan is extremely vulnerable to losing their population to infectious 
disease that The Sudan is immune to.  Constant engagement between these two countries 
could wreak havoc on the South Sudanese people.  Lessons from the Spanish flu in 1918-
1919, teach us that infectious diseases inflict everyone and have the power to alter the 
outcome of a conflict.  Many historians believe that the Spanish flu was responsible for 
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the speedy conclusion to WWI.137  However, the outcome could have been very different 
if immunity was monopolized by one side of the conflict.  The Sudan enjoys a 90 percent 
immunization rate, a rate much higher than South Sudan and this could alter the outcome 
of future disputes in that region. 
 The subsequent case studies on the immunity of a nation and the correlation to its 
failed attempts to maintain power over its territory and people should provide a clearer 
insight to the question as to whether or not immunity can be used as a passive weapon of 
mass destruction.  The intentional or unintentional exposure of infectious diseases to 
unimmunized societies had a severe impact on the native populations of the Pacific and 
the American continent.  These societies offered prospects of wealth and power to foreign 
occupiers, who could overcome the indigenous power.  The task to overthrow these 
societies on military and man power alone posed several unique problems; 1) 
geographical isolation, meant that occupiers had to travel long distances to arrive to these 
areas, 2) established and numerous native populations, meant they could easily out 
number their foreign occupiers, 3) limited supplies, the occupiers had little to use, 
whereas the natives knew their land and had everything they needed to fight, 4) time, the 
native populations were not on a time schedule and could fight until the occupiers were 
gone.  The occupiers were either under order from their governments or at the mercy of 
budgets that had real time implications; 5) established hierarchical society, the native 
society was well established with legitimate governance.  It would have been difficult for 
occupiers to replace it though brute force and subjugation. Therefore, the foreign 
occupiers needed something to assist in getting rid of these problems.  Unintentionally, 
137 GrrlScientist. Influenza: How the Great War helped create the greatest pandemic ever known. The 




                                                          
they had the solution with them. 
Disease in the Kingdom of Hawai’i 
 Hawai’i is not usually the first place people think of when deadly infectious 
diseases and plagues are mentioned. However, much like many colonized isolated areas 
in the world throughout history, Hawai’i was no exception to the death and destruction 
from viruses brought by foreign visitors to the islands. The Hawaiians’ battle with these 
illnesses as they battled land grabs by the American government and foreign 
businessmen, which led to an inevitable decline in population, power and legitimacy.  
 In 1778, during the time Captain Cook arrived in the Hawaiian Islands, there were 
approximately 800,000 native Hawaiians and a formalized governance structure in the 
form of a monarchy.  From the time of Cook’s arrival to 1820 the native Hawaiian 
population had decrease to 135,000, a decline attributed to the Hawaiian’s lack of 
immunity to many of the infectious diseases brought by the foreign visitors, which they 
had been immune.138  Additionally, King Kahmehameha II along with his wife, Queen 
Kamamalu and several others in his royal court died of measles on their visit to London, 
England because none of them had immunity to the disease.139  Their death and the 
decline in the native population led to several advantages for foreign dominance.  The 
first advantage was that political legitimacy was in question. Due to the foreigners’ 
immunity to sickness, many native Hawaiians viewed them as immortal and believed 
they were gods.  This checked the power of native religion and the monarchy.  Secondly, 
the population was a fraction of what it was. This had enormous impacts on villages and 
138 LANGER, ELINOR. 2008. "FAMOUS ARE THE FLOWERS. (cover story)." Nation, April 28. 15. 
139 Theophilus Harris Davies (July 26, 1889). "The last hours of Liholiho and Kamamalu: a letter sent to 
H.R.H. Princess Liliuokalani presented to the Hawaiian Historical Society". Annual report of the Hawaiian 
Historical Society 1897. pp. 30–32. 
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the governance structure in the islands.  There is strength in numbers and the natives saw 
their strength dwindle with their numbers.  In 1898, a little more than one hundred years 
from the arrival of Captain Cook and Christian missionaries the native Hawaiian 
population was around 40,000, including individuals that had at least 50 percent native 
Hawaiian heritage.140  By the time the United States decided to move toward an act of 
war against the Kingdom of Hawai’i and annex the independent nation, the people and 
their monarch were decimated by illness.  Migrants from China, the Philippines, Japan 
and the United States outnumbered the native Hawaiian population.  The monarch was no 
longer supported and could not control the population.   
 Although there are many factors that contributed to the decline of Hawaiian 
power and the increase in foreign influence.  The lack of immunity to diseases brought by 
Europeans and Americans had the most devastating impact on the health of the Hawaiian 
people, Hawaiian socio-political structure, and the security of their country.  As more 
Hawaiians died, land ownership by natives decreased and left more lands to be bought 
and sold to companies and foreigners-- giving Hawaiians less rights and foreign land 
owners more opportunity and power.141  Immunity to sickness gave white foreigners 
more power and influence over the Hawaiian economy and inevitably the power to 
overthrow the government.  Had the native Hawaiians had the immunity to fight off 
measles and common illnesses then history would be telling us a different story.  The 
Hawaiian population would have flourished amid the economic boom in sugar and the 
monarch would have maintained political legitimacy in the face of foreign aggressors by 
collecting larger tax revenues.  The unintentional consequences of their immunity to 
140  Langor. p3 
141 Banner, Stuart. "Preparing to Be Colonized: Land Tenure and Legal Strategy in Nineteenth-Century 
Hawaii." Law & Society Review 39, no. 2 (June 2005): 273-314. P.277 
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infectious disease led to their ultimate take-over.  Without the power of immunity, the 
European and American foreigners would not have seemed immortal in the midst of a 
pandemic. 
 
The Conquistador’s Epidemic 
Figure 2. The First Smallpox Epidemic in the New World 
 
Source: Population & Development Review, Jun2006, Vol. 32 Issue 2, p199-232, 34p, 4 Charts, 1 Map 
Map; found on p. 214 
 
 In the spring of 1519, Spanish Captain Hernando Cortes arrived on the eastern 
coast of Mexico.  He arrived to a land inhabited by an estimated 22 million indigenous 
people.  Cortes had roughly 600 soldiers at his side to fight and defend himself if 
necessary.142  Severely outnumbered, Cortes tried his luck in challenging Montezuma by 
recruiting native allies and exploiting the weak allegiances to Montezuma and the capitol 
city.  He employed roughly 1,000 warriors to help him fight. Still extremely 
142 Mee, Charles L. "That fateful moment when two civilizations came face to face." Smithsonian 23, 
(October 1992): 56 
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outnumbered, Cortes’ luck changed on May of 1520 when another Spanish fleet arrived 
with 900 more Spanish soldiers and a slave with smallpox.  Although, the native 
population had put up a good fight against Cortes and banded together to defeat the 
Spanish.  They were soon overwhelmed by the amount of death caused by smallpox and 
other newly introduced diseases.  Although, the fighting had ended with the native 
population decimated and a new foreign power in control the destruction from the 
smallpox virus continued to scourge the countryside.  An approximate 20 million died of 
the original 22 million indigenous inhabitants.143  In a little less than seven years the 
Spanish had conquered an ancient civilization and admit that it was of no might of their 
own besides the fact that they introduced the smallpox virus to the Aztec people, who had 
never been exposed to it before.144   
 Spain gained an immense amount of territory as part of their New World 
conquest.  Unfortunately, the depleted native population, which allowed them to gain 
more territory, left the Spanish settlers with the necessary labor they needed to mine gold 
and silver and work in sugar plantations.  However, the colonization of the Americas was 
overall profitable to the Spanish Empire. So much so that the period between the 16th and 
17th is commonly referred to as “The Golden Age of Spain.”145  Yet, their claim to victory 
was the native’s lack of immunity to the smallpox virus.  
 In the case of the fall of the Aztec civilization and Spanish dominance, there are 
several reason that could have aided in Spanish conquest, sans a deadly infectious 
disease; 1) the political alliances in the Aztec Empire were volatile and many natives 
143 Ibid. p.59 
144 Stutz, Bruce. "Megadeath in Mexico." Discover 27, no. 2 (February 2006): 44-51. 




                                                          
sought alliance with the Spanish to overthrow Montezuma’s rule, 2) Access to the New 
World from Spain was not as difficult, 3) the Spanish were so technologically advanced 
in weapons and warfare that they would have been able to overcome the native populace.  
Yet, the Spanish increased their chances 90 percent with the death of 20 million 
unimmunized Aztecs.  
 Shortly after the fall of the Aztec Empire, the Inca Empire followed in the same 
footsteps.  In 1525, Spanish explorers set out to verify rumors of the immense wealth of 
gold and silver of the Incas.  When they arrived they found themselves in the midst of a 
civil war between the two surviving sons of the late Incan Emperor, this allowed the 
Spanish access to eventually kill the victor along with approximately one million Incas.  
However, the Spanish explorers that pillaged the Inca Empire did not have the manpower 
to fight the Inca warriors, instead they also had help from the smallpox virus that raged 
through the existing Inca population after their bloody civil war.146  The lack of immunity 
to the infectious smallpox virus meant the death of the Inca Empire, culture and power.  
The smallpox virus assisted the Spanish in the death and destruction of ancient 
civilizations that otherwise would have continued.   
 The devastating effect on infectious diseases on the indigenous people of Hawaii 
and the Americas was exacerbated by the lack of immunity to the newly introduced virus 
many Europeans and Americans had immunity to.  Had the Europeans and Americans 
lacked immunity to the deadly diseases they would not have been able to leverage the 
losses to measles and smallpox on the native populations.  Due to the drastic impacts on 
these populations the foreign occupiers capitalized on the access to new labor, trade, and 
146 Thomson, Mark. "The migration of smallpox and its indelible footprint on Latin American history." 
History Teacher 32, no. 1 (November 1998): 117-131. 
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raw materials.  Immunity gave them the ability to continue their affairs as the native 
populations decrease around them.  These three examples of the role immunity played in 
the shift of power epitomize the unintentional consequences of dual-use medical 
countermeasures and the moral dilemma to immune some and withhold it from others.  
Therefore, the questions remains, does immunity create intentional strategic positioning?  
Can the increase in vaccine production of endemic viruses in developed nations pose an 
unintentional problem for unimmunized societies in the modern world?  The previous 
case studies illustrate the geo-political advances of an immune population and the mass 
casualty of a passive biological agent.  
Conclusion 
 From the previously presented information it is apparent that immunity to 
virulent, communicable diseases can be used as a weapon of mass casualty and 
disruption. However, does immunity create intentional strategic positioning and can the 
increase in vaccine production of endemic viruses in developed nations pose an 
unintentional problem for unimmunized societies in the modern world?  The lessons 
learned from the case studies provide an idea of the strategic role immunity of deadly 
viruses and infectious diseases can have on developing or emerging societies.  
Additionally, by examining vaccination coverage rates from the World Health 
Organization in the top ten most fragile states according to the Fund for Peace’s Fragile 
State Index, we can draw a conclusion as to the vulnerability states have that don’t have 
high rates of immunization to some of the world’s most endemic infectious diseases 
namely; measles, HepB, and polio.   
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 Drawing on the history and lessons learned from the Kingdom of Hawai’i and the 
Aztec and Incan Empires, these identified countries with low vaccination rates may be at 
further risk of losing their power or geo-political standing if they are subject to a regional 
rival that has sufficient immunity to various infectious diseases.  The current Ebola virus 
pandemic has tested these notions of vaccine development, testing, and international 
intervention.  The disparity between rich developed nations and their ability to vaccinate 
their populations against virulent infectious disease and those developing countries that 
don’t-- is exacerbated during international epidemics.  The death rate of Western African 
countries and their inability to contain the virus will have extreme geopolitical and 
economic impacts for many years to come. Similar to the historical cases, the economic 
and political gain from their loss is reserved for those with the most immunity.  
 It is clear that the race to vaccinate large portions of a country’s population is a 
defense mechanism, not only against sickness, but the possible decline of a nation.  As 
public health and national security intersect, the medical advances made by some 
countries could be used as a biological defense against others.  Immunity will become a 
passive biological weapon, threatening those who are not immune.  The danger in 
defensive immunity is that it leaves people out of the vaccination loop.  These left out are 
already vulnerable and insecure. The creation of vaccines and the development of 
isolated immunity could potentially create a host or reservoir population for a superbug.  
Therefore, when that population exposes another unexposed population to this superbug, 
the outcome could be devastating, repeating the historical examples.  
 Although as noted previously there are many factors that contributed to the 
vulnerability of the native populations in Hawai’i and the New World, but nothing 
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assisted the Europeans and Americans get an advantage like the infectious disease they 
had been immune to.  The Europeans and Americans had technology and sophisticated 
weapons along with western civilization, but even those resources could not have 
depleted the populations so much to the point of submission.  The defensive use of 
biotechnology to protect people from sickness is a necessary function of health security.  
Yet, the proliferation of bioagents to defensively create a countermeasure is excessive 
and dangerous.  This type of research skips the natural evolution of immunity, a 
symbiotic relationship humans have had with their natural environment.  In the case of 
the indigenous populations fighting a foreign disease, the artificial development of 
antivirals can also cause an epidemiological problem by introducing new infectious 
diseases unknown to man.  As the developed world works toward super immunity only 
time will tell how their geopolitical influence will change due to it.  However, it has been 
shown that immunity can be used as a weapon of mass casualty to advance political and 













 The examination of various themes and issues within biodefense and biosecurity 
are complex and deserve a more predominate place in the national security sphere.  As 
technology, warfare, and health intersect the issues previously examined in this thesis 
will be further highlighted and become a major concern for states’ development and 
safety.  Illness has always existed as a part of human life.  Buddhist philosophy 
categorizes sickness as one of the four noble truths, an unescapable reality of life, along 
with birth, aging and death.  Therefore, efforts to mitigate deadly bacteria and viruses’ 
effects on the human condition and provide a better quality of life for those suffering is a 
noble practice.  However, it is the reality that violent non-state actors and rogue states are 
going to try to use whatever they can to inflict pain and death on those they oppose.  The 
reality of biological weapons is that they are non-discriminatory, they will inflict 
everyone and anyone, and even those that intend to harm others with them.  This simple 
truth is the very reasons why biodefense has dual-use capabilities that make necessary 
medical countermeasures appear to proliferate deadly infectious diseases. Yet, as 
mentioned before, these efforts are dual-use regardless of the intention behind their 
creation.  Although, the world has yet to see a large scale biological weapons attack or 
secured universal biosurveillance, as long as there is sickness, there will be need for a 
countermeasure.  
Chapter One explored the Amerithrax attack of 2001 where, seven letters 
containing weapons grade anthrax was delivered to two Senate offices and five major 
news media outlets.  These seven letters contaminated multiple facilities that cost the 
United States approximately $6 billion in damages and five individuals their lives.  The 
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psychological impact of this attack still guides policy and drives the justification for 
biodefense expansion.  Security measures have been introduced and suggested far beyond 
the scope that this incident evolved.  During fiscal year 2010 to 2011 the United States 
spent roughly $879 billion on biodefense for the Department of Homeland Security and 
$663 billion in the form of countermeasure research and development.    
The conclusion of this chapter found that biodefense research and development on 
medical countermeasures is a strategy that creates the greatest insecurity. The equation 
presented in Chapter One suggested that an increase in any of the strategy measures 
contributed to an increase in biodefense and subsequently increased national security 
regardless of what that strategy measure was.  This is flawed based on the observation 
that medical countermeasures proliferate dangerous pathogens at the risk of causing a 
pandemic or encouraging other states to counter others’ medical countermeasures’ 
research, which create secret biodefense programs that can’t be monitored.  From the 
case study we saw that not all biodefense strategies are created equally and that it is too 
simplistic to declare biodefense causes insecurity.  Many factors were presented that 
make up biodefense and the various outcomes each has.  Yet, there are particular 
strategies that multiply threats and others that are truly defensive in nature.  The 
Amerithrax, 2001 Anthrax Letters provide a great narrative for explaining this complex 
relationship for at least two reasons. One, the case is still inconclusive due to many of the 
reasons that make biological weapons very dangerous and two, the impact it had on 
national security spending in biodefense. 
Through the analysis in Chapter One, it is conclusive that proliferating biological 
weapons for the sake of defensive strategies is not the path toward security.  
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Governments should work together to bring biodefense programs out of obscurity and 
secrecy.  The dual-use dilemma of biodefense is due to states dishonest practices and 
misrepresenting their intentions.  Once governments reveal the true nature of biodefense 
by actually engaging in measures that will defend, like investing in personal protection 
equipment, biosurveillance, intelligence collection and analysis, and invest in public 
preparedness and response, we will be in a better position to counter dual-use 
capabilities.   
Chapter One illustrated that we are less secure with the current biodefense 
strategy.  Its effectiveness has not been proven and the chapter has explained that the 
United States is promoting biodefense strategies that are creating insecurity and are not 
effective defensive strategies and that these strategies appear to make things easier for 
VNSAs or rogue states to use a biological weapon. 
However, this study concludes that biological agents are complex organisms that 
require advanced understanding of biotechnology and engineering to effectively 
weaponize them into a weapon of mass destruction and this understanding is currently 
beyond the advancements of modern biotechnology and modern terrorist groups and 
VNSA motivation. Chapter Two explains that terrorists are technologically challenged 
and weigh weapons complexity against impact, expecting guaranteed high impact results 
for increasingly technical complex weapons.  
 Furthermore, terrorist organizational structure and methods of operation 
determine the capability and motives for investing time and resources into 
technologically complex weapons and very few groups that have the capabilities and 
resources are not motivated enough to use biological weapons.  Conversely, those groups 
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that have the motivation to use biological weapons do not have the means.  Therefore, the 
union between terrorism and biological weapons is an unhappy and dysfunctional 
relationship.  The current assumptions on bioterrorism as we understand it does not suit 
the group or the weapon and this is the main reason why the United States has not 
experienced a large scale, biological weapons attack by a violent non-state actor in the 
post WWII era. 
 Chapter Two examines many variables that could be included to answer, why the 
United States has not experienced a large scale, biological weapons attack by a violent 
non-state actor in the post WWII era?  Although, the study could be more comprehensive 
in referencing various efforts to mitigate the possibilities of violent non-states actors’ 
abilities to acquire or use biological weapons, it showcases the profiles of those willing to 
use a biological weapon and their motives.  Yet, Chapter Two provides a clear case that 
adequately shows, the United States is safe from a large-scale bioterrorism attack until 
highly motivated, organized terrorists expect less impact for their effort. 
 Even if a bioterrorist wanted to inflict mass casualty on a population it is not clear 
that it would do that much damage.  The United States’ ability to counter infectious 
diseases through a multitude of non-pharmaceutical interventions and vaccinations is a 
testament to U.S. biosecurity strategy and overall immunity. Chapter Three examined the 
natural defense and the medical countermeasures we rely on the support those natural 
defense systems.  
Finally, Chapter Three questioned immunity’s intentional strategic positioning 
and how the increase in vaccine production of endemic viruses in developed nations pose 
an unintentional problem for unimmunized societies in the modern world.  The lessons 
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learned from the case studies provided an idea of the strategic role immunity of deadly 
viruses and infectious diseases can have on developing or emerging societies.  
Additionally, by examining vaccination coverage rates from the World Health 
Organization in the top ten most fragile states, we drew a conclusion that vulnerable 
states that don’t have high rates of immunization to some of the world’s most endemic 
infectious diseases namely; measles, HepB, and polio are at great risk for decline 
regionally and possibly face political extinction.   
 Lessons learned from the historical case studies-- Kingdom of Hawai’i and the 
Aztec and Incan Empires, these identified countries with low vaccination rates may be at 
further risk of losing their power or geo-political standing if they are subject to a regional 
rival that has sufficient immunity to various infectious diseases.  The disparity between 
rich developed nations and their ability to vaccinate their populations against virulent 
infectious disease and those developing countries that don’t-- is exacerbated during 
international epidemics.  The death rate of Western African countries and their inability 
to contain the virus will have extreme geopolitical and economic impacts for many years 
to come.  Similar to the historical cases, the economic and political gain from their loss is 
reserved for those with the most immunity.  
 It is clear that the race to vaccinate large portions of a country’s population is a 
defense mechanism, not only against sickness, but the possible decline of a nation.  As 
public health and national security intersect, the medical advances made by some 
countries could be used as a biological defense against others.  Immunity will become a 
passive biological weapon, threatening those who are not immune.  The danger in 
defensive immunity is that it leaves people out of the vaccination loop.  These left out are 
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already vulnerable and insecure. The creation of vaccines and the development of 
isolated immunity could potentially create a host or reservoir population for a superbug.  
Therefore, when that population exposes another unexposed population to this superbug, 
the outcome could be devastating, repeating the historical examples.  
 Although as noted previously there are many factors that contributed to the 
vulnerability of the native populations in Hawai’i and the New World, but nothing 
assisted the Europeans and Americans get an advantage like the infectious disease they 
had been immune to.  The Europeans and Americans had technology and sophisticated 
weapons along with western civilization, but even those resources could not have 
depleted the populations so much to the point of submission.  The defensive use of 
biotechnology to protect people from sickness is a necessary function of health security.  
Yet, the proliferation of bioagents to defensively create a countermeasure is excessive 
and dangerous.  This type of research skips the natural evolution of immunity, a 
symbiotic relationship humans have had with their natural environment.  In the case of 
the indigenous populations fighting a foreign disease, the artificial development of 
antivirals can also cause an epidemiological problem by introducing new infectious 
diseases unknown to man.  As the developed world works toward super immunity only 
time will tell how their geopolitical influence will change due to it.  However, it has been 
shown that immunity can be used as a weapon of mass casualty to advance political and 
economic gain; it is a bioweapon that epitomizes the dual-use designation. 
 Throughout this thesis the overarching theme is that we are making biological 
weapons more virulent, more accessible, and diverse.  The advancements in technology 
continue to stretch the limits of security and the possibilities for bioagents use. Through 
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these various studies on biosecurity and biodefense more needs to be done to educate the 
public on symptoms, non-pharmaceutical interventions, and natural defense 
strengthening. The medical countermeasure production is creating opportunities for 
superbugs and proliferating potential deadly diseases. Overall, biosecurity should focus 
on community mitigation and the goal for biotechnology should focus on the greater 
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